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INTRODUCTION 
 
The evolution of the Supreme Court’s remedial jurisprudence evinces a quest for 
the ultimate judicial measure of appropriate relief, emerging as a norm of remedial 
proportionality.1  The Court’s decisions since 2000 on punitive damages, injunctions, 
and remedial legislation, all mandate a strict balance and precise measurement in the 
formulation of civil remedies.  These cases have often fallen below the radar of general 
interest or have been ignored for their remedial significance.2  However, these cases 
demonstrate, somewhat surprisingly, the manner in which the Court has ventured into 
the arena of common-law remedies to unexpectedly alter the foundational principles of 
crafting remedies.  This article exposes and critiques the extent to which proportionality 
dominates the remedial decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the new 
millennium.   
 “Proportionality” is fast becoming a universal standard of rationality in the 
international public law context.3  Indeed, “[t]he concept has received far more 
elaboration and evaluation outside of the United States.”4  Proportionality is a general 
legal principle for avoiding excess and “reviewing the conformity to the law of any 
public discretionary action.”5  It is a “yardstick for measuring the appropriate 
relationship between the ends and the means of discretionary action.”6  International 
jurists use proportionality to evaluate the extent to which government intrudes on the 
paramount individual rights of citizens.7  However, American legal scholars have not 
embraced the advent of this new test because it “sounds unfamiliar, dangerous for the 
protection of civil rights, and illustrative of the conservatism of the Court.”8  These 
fears appear well-founded as the Supreme Court has co-opted proportionality as its own 
                                                 
1 A purist’s definition of “remedies” is used here to mean only questions regarding the civil sanction 
assessed in the case whether in the form of monetary relief or official directive.  Excluded from the 
definition of remedy are other legal issues interrelated to remedies, such as immunity, private rights of 
action, preemption, and justiciability.  See Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies, 76 
WASH. L. REV. 67 (2001).   
2 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2004 Term, Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 169 (2005); Charles H. 
Whitebread, Going Out With a Whimper: A Term of Tinkering and Fine Tuning, The Supreme Court’s 
2004-05 Term, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 77 (2005).  
3  See Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803, 803-04 
(2004) (reviewing DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004)); see also T. Jeremy Gunn, 
Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 465 (2005); Elisabeth 
Zoller, Congruence and Proportionality for Congressional Enforcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or 
Velvet Revolution?, 78 IND. L. J. 567, 568 (2003); D.W. Greig, Reciprocity, Proportionality, and the Law 
of Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 322 (1994). 
4 Jackson, supra note 3, at 803-04; Gunn, supra note 3, at 465; Zoller, supra note 3, at 568. 
5 Zoller, supra note 3, at 581-82. 
6 Id. at 582. 
7 See Jackson supra note 3, at 804; see, e.g., R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103 (Can.). 
8 Zoller, supra note 3, at 568 (“From a comparative law perspective, the new test is not as bad as it 
sounds. . . . [I]t introduces into American constitutional law a standard of judicial review that has proved 
to be useful in many continental European countries. . . .”). 
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standard for protecting governmental and corporate interests against the individual 
plaintiff.     
The article begins by taking a positivist view to describe how the Court has 
utilized proportionality in its remedial decisions.  It first explains the Court’s theory of 
remedial essentialism, which forms the foundation for the rule of remedial 
proportionality.  The theory of remedial essentialism formalistically separates the 
remedy from the right, and it is this binary concept that establishes the premise of 
balance inherent in proportionality.  This notion of balance or equilibrium draws on 
theories from Aristotle and law and economics mandating a precise remedial balance as 
a proxy for justice.  Practically speaking, the rule of proportionality engages the court in 
a type of “Three Bears” analysis under which it evaluates whether the remedy is too big, 
too small, or just right. The article synthesizes the most recent Supreme Court cases on 
remedies to flesh out the principles of proportionality driving the Court’s decisions.  
These remedial decisions emanate from a wide variety of factual contexts, including 
abortion, water rights, insurance, patents, and tribal immunity.  Yet, the decisions 
coalesce in transsubstantive fashion around the assumed foundational truth of remedial 
proportionality as the ultimate measure of civil justice.  
After tracing the development of strict proportionality in the Supreme Court, the 
article then engages in a normative analysis to evaluate whether proportionality should 
in fact be the guiding principle of remedies law.  It begins with the identification of the 
Court’s justifications for the rule.  The Court seems to value proportionality for its 
rationality and objectivity, judicial restraint and minimalism, and reciprocal response.  
However, the article reveals these claims of rationality, restraint, and reciprocity as 
myths.  Proportionality is not an objective standard.  Continued reliance upon these 
myths creates significant legal dangers by obscuring the subjective framing issues 
inherent in a rule of comparison and unduly deferring to the interests of the wrongdoers.  
When the rule of proportionality is deconstructed, it becomes apparent that 
proportionality is not a rule of restraint, but rather one of activism.  The article 
ultimately rejects the continued use of remedial proportionality and its fostering of 
judicial activism by the highest Court.  Instead, it recommends a return to the traditional 
judicial review of remedies deferring to the initial factfinders in each case.      
 
1. PROPORTIONALITY AS REMEDIAL EQUILIBRIUM  
 
In the Supreme Court’s recent remedial decisions, the Court appears to be 
searching for the perfect measure of relief in each case.  The series of important 
remedial decisions reveals that the Court has seized upon proportionality as its 
foundational principle of objectivity to resolve questions of remedy.9  The Court has not 
articulated its reasons for the adoption of proportionality as the governing principle nor 
explored its theoretical underpinnings.  Reading between the lines, the Court (except for 
Justice Scalia) seems to view the proportionality rule as an objective rule that can 
consistently enforce the norm of fairness in crafting judicial remedies.  The Court 
                                                 
9 Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis Under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469, 479 (1999). 
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assumes it has adopted a neutral principle of law that constrains the power of judicial 
interpretation.  This formalistic and mechanical rule of law now appears to be the 
governing principle upon which most of the Court’s remedial decisions will be based. 
 
A. Remedial Essentialism 
 
Remedial essentialism, the theoretical premise that a remedy is conceptually 
isolated from the underlying substantive right, is the necessary predicate to the Court’s 
principle of remedial proportionality.  This formalistic separation of remedy from right 
provides the foundation for proportionality, for without two separate interests, the 
notion of balancing carries little meaning.   
The Court’s legal formalism depicts rights as primary and remedies as 
secondary.10  A primary right is a legal duty, guarantee, or expectation, whereas the 
remedial right is the consequence or sanction following the non-compliance with the 
primary right.11  “Rights essentialism” isolates the core legal principle of right from the 
translation of that right through facts and policy in the real world.12   For judges, this 
means that remedial decisions imposing tangible consequences for the right leave the 
right inviolate rather than diminished or enhanced by the practical reality.13  Rights 
essentialism establishes a binary concept of right and remedy that subordinates 
remedies to the more valuable core legal value.  In other words, “rights and remedies 
are made of different stuff—and the rights stuff is better.”14  Remedial essentialism is 
the necessary corollary that segregates the inferior remedy in judicial decisionmaking to 
immunize the right.         
Examples of remedial essentialism are apparent throughout the Court’s remedial 
jurisprudence.  Take, for example, the Court’s 2006 decision in Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of Northern New England.15  In Ayotte, New Hampshire appealed the 
invalidation of its Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act, which the lower courts 
struck down in its entirety due to the absence of a medical emergency exception.16  
Justice O’Connor, writing for a unanimous Court repeatedly stated that the decision was 
simply a “question of remedy” and not one of legal rights.17  In the decision’s opening 
                                                 
10 See HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 122-34 (William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey eds., 1994) (creating 
dichotomy between primary and remedial rights); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) 
(distinguishing between primary rights of substantive claim and secondary rights of remedy). 
11 Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 684 
(2001) [hereinafter “Remedial Rights”]. 
12 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 900 
(1999). 
13 Levinson, supra note 12, at 900 (arguing that normative theories about constitutional rights should not 
be separated from the positive realities of their remedial enforcement). 
14 Id. at 858; see Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 678 (1983) (describing the 
right/remedy distinction in constitutional law as “pure rights, dirty remedies”). 
15 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006). 
16 Id. at 964.   
17 Id. at 964, 967; Linda Greenhouse, Court Walks Fine Line on Teenage Abortions, INT’L HERALD TRIB. 
2 (Jan. 2, 2006) (“The studiously bland 10-page opinion carefully sidestepped the abortion debate that has 
been such a prominent feature of public discourse about the Court’s future.”). 
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line, Justice O’Connor emphasized: “We do not revisit our abortion precedents today, 
but rather address a question of remedy.”18  The Court went on to vacate the 
invalidation of the abortion statute, holding that “invalidating a statute entirely is not 
always necessary or justified, for lower courts may be able to render narrow declaratory 
and injunctive relief.”19  Thus, the Court asserted that as a remedial decision, the Ayotte 
opinion had no impact upon its abortion jurisprudence.20     
The Court’s essentialist view of remedies is also seen in City of Sherrill v. 
Oneida Indian Nation.21  In Sherrill, the Court explicitly emphasized that the right is 
very different from the remedy:  “The substantive questions whether the plaintiff has 
any right or the defendant any duty, and if so what it is, are very different questions 
from the remedial questions whether this remedy or that is preferred, and what the 
measure of the remedy is.”22  The Sherrill Court reiterated the right of the Oneida tribe 
to ownership of ancient tribal lands it had purchased on the open market, but applied the 
remedial doctrine of laches to deny the requested declaratory and injunctive relief 
exempting the tribal owners from county taxes.23  The Court raised the remedial issue 
sua sponte and decided the case under “standards of federal equity practice,” refusing to 
consider the substantive questions of tax immunity and definitions of “Indian country” 
decided below and argued by the parties.24  The eight-Justice majority25 rested its 
                                                 
18 Id. at 964.  See Tony Mauro, High Court Sidesteps Dispute Over Parental Notification for Abortion, 
183 N.J.L.J. 197 (Jan. 23, 2006) (stating that Justice O’Connor avoided a major showdown on abortion 
rights in her valedictory writing which was based on the narrower remedial ground). 
19 Ayotte, 126 S.Ct. at 964.  
20 However, as the Court admitted, this holding does in fact revisit past precedents by contradicting the 
decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000), invalidating an abortion statute in its entirety.  
Ayotte, 126 S.Ct. at 969.  See also Note, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights With Renewed 
“Purpose,” 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552 (2006) (noting that courts have traditionally used a broad, facial 
invalidation remedy for unconstitutional abortion statutes, but that Ayotte suggests the Court may be 
rethinking their approach as to the function that broad abortion remedies have served); Mauro, supra note 
19 (quoting opinion that Ayotte “can be read as almost an explicit invitation for states to revive or repass 
restrictions that previously have been struck down in toto.”). 
21 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
22 Id. at 213 (citing D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.2 p. 3 (1973)).  
23 Id. at 216-17.  Laches is an equitable defense that bars a remedy when plaintiffs have unreasonably 
delayed in prosecuting the action causing prejudice to the other side.  DOBBS, supra note 22.  Here, the 
Court said that the long lapse of time (200 years) during which the Oneidas did not seek to revive their 
sovereign control through equitable relief in court, and the dramatic changes in the character of the 
property from reservation to city during that time precluded the tribe “from gaining the disruptive remedy 
it now seeks.”  Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 199. 
24 Id. at 214 n.8.  While the Court claimed that its remedial decision did not address the underlying 
substantive rights, the precedential effect of the case has been to the contrary.  See Amy Borgman, Note, 
Stamping Out the Embers of Tribal Sovereignty: City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation and Its 
Aftermath, 10 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 59, 60 (2006) (“Sherrill has dramatically altered the legal 
landscape against which courts will consider tribes’ claims. . . . [T]he message is clear: the American 
Court system will no longer sympathize with tribes seeking retribution for past wrongs.”); Leading Cases, 
Availability of Equitable Relief, 119 HARV. L. REV. 347 (2005) (arguing that the Court correctly ruled 
given its inability to adjudicate the type of reparative justice claim raised by the Indians that is properly 
left to the political branches).   
25 Justice Stevens dissented on grounds that the Court’s decision could not be squared with its prior 
decision authorizing damages for the same claim, stating that the “Court’s reliance on the distinctions 
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decision solidly upon the distinction between right and remedy:  the tribe had a “right” 
to tribal property ownership, but no remedial mechanism to enforce that right 
prospectively.26     
Again, in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange the Court held that “a right is distinct 
from the provision of remedies for violations of that right.”27  The Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit had held that a patent holder’s right to exclude competitors from 
practicing an invention was sufficiently strong to merit a presumption of qualifying for 
an injunction in every case.28  This categorical rule altered the common-law principle of 
injunctive relief which requires a showing of the inadequacy of plaintiff’s monetary 
remedies and a balancing of hardships between the parties, court, and public.29  In 
reversing the Federal Circuit’s remedial decision, a unanimous Supreme Court 
disaggregated right from remedy in the patent context and remanded the decision with 
clear instructions that the right not dictate the appropriate balance for equitable relief.30  
In other words, the injunctive remedy is an absolute legal principle which should not be 
diluted by the interaction with the attendant legal right. 
This right/remedy dichotomy has been criticized by scholars, including me, who 
have illustrated how the measure or enforcement of a remedy, or lack thereof, 
significantly alters the effective meaning of the substantive legal right.31  It was the 
American legal realists who believed that it was erroneous to view a legal right 
abstracted from the remedy available in the legal system.32   “As form cannot always be 
separate from substance in a work of art, so adjective or remedies aspects cannot be 
                                                                                                                                               
between law and equity and between substantive rights and remedies is indefensible.”  544 U.S. at 226.  
He also challenged the Court’s use of laches to resolve the case since the issued had not been briefed and 
the tribe could avoid the equitable defense of laches by reasserting their claim for immunity as a defense 
in a state tax collection action.  Id. at 224-26.   
26 Id. at 221.  On remand, the district court held that New York state law precludes county taxation of 
property owned by Indian tribes.  Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219, 232 
(N.D.N.Y. 2005).   
27 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006). 
28 MercExchange v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
29 126 S. Ct. at 1841. 
30 Id. at 1840.  Similarly, in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 764 (2007), the Court, in an 
opinion joined by all of the Justices except Justice Thomas, overturned the Federal Circuit’s attempt to 
carve out a special rule of declaratory relief in patent cases.  The Federal Circuit denied jurisdiction on a 
declaratory judgment claim where the party to the patent licensing agreement had not yet breached the 
agreement.  Id. at 768.  The Court reaffirmed the rule that a party need not subject itself to penalty prior 
to seeking declaratory relief.  Id. at 772.   
31 Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 11, at 687-88 (arguing for the “unified right theory” of remedies 
in which the remedy and its definitional guarantee are two components of one unified whole); Levinson, 
supra note 12, at 858 (arguing that normative theories of constitutional rights cannot be separated from 
realities of remedial enforcement); David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores 
and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 66 (1997) (discussing the 
“inextricable relationship” between right and remedy in the context of congressional remedies for 
immigration under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter 
Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. REV. 735 (1992) (viewing constitutional rights through 
the prism of remedies).   
32 See Friedman, supra note 31, at 736; see, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism--
Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1244 (1931).  
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parted entirely from substantive ones.”33  For example, a contractual promise is only as 
good as the remedy that backs it up; for if the law sustains an efficient breach, a 
contracting party is not in fact required to honor his legal promise.34 
Scholars have thus criticized the overly formalistic conceptualization of rights 
that minimizes the importance of remedies, and masks the effect of remedial 
decisions.35   Professor Levinson articulated how the “deeply embedded and deeply 
misleading” theory of rights essentialism provides an “oversimplified picture of the 
relationship between rights and remedies.”36  Instead, Levinson and others have 
demonstrated how remedies are functionally related, and inextricably intertwined with 
rights.37  Remedies are the practical, real, and functional component that actualizes the 
right and makes it operational between the parties.38   
Despite this academic insight, the Court seems mired in the formalistic belief 
that remedies are isolated legal concepts that should be adjudicated apart from the 
connected substantive right.  Adopting a modernist philosophy, the Court has 
constructed an allegedly objective rule of proportionality to reconcile the binary 
right/remedy construct and constrain the power of judicial interpretation.39  This 
foundational assumption of remedial essentialism effectively minimizes the significance 
of the Court’s remedial decisions by subordinating the ancillary remedy to the important 
foundational right.40   
It is the binary thinking of remedial essentialism that makes proportionality 
possible as a formalist rule.  However, it is also this essentialist thinking that begins the 
Court’s detour in the jurisprudence of remedies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 116 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
34 LON L. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (1947); Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 11, at 693. 
35 Levinson, supra note 12, at 858; Thomas, supra note 12; Zeigler, supra note 1, at 67; Friedman, supra 
note 31, at 738. 
36 Levinson, supra note 12, at 858. 
37 Id.; see Friedman, supra note 31, at 735; Gewirtz, supra note 14, at 678-79; Thomas, Remedial Rights, 
supra note 11, at 687-88; Donald Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement 
of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 665-66 (1987). 
38 Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 11, at 687-88. 
39 Cf. GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 3, 
5-6, 41 (1995) (describing the tenets of legal modernism as belief in rules of law that embody universal 
truths, core essences, and foundational theories that provide for objective and consistent decisionmaking 
to discover the “right answers” in every case). 
40 Following the formalist remedial binary and ignoring the unified nature of right and remedy leads to 
difficult decisions.  For example, in the case of Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the Court misdiagnosed 
a case involving the failure to enforce a remedy as a case of substantive right.  545 U.S. 748, 125 S. Ct. 
2796 (2005).  The plaintiff sought damages under the Due Process Clause for the police department’s 
repeated failure to enforce a restraining order against her husband.  Id. at 2800.  The failure ultimately led 
to her ex-husband’s horrific murder of their three children.  Id. at 2802.  In divorcing right from remedy, 
the Court was able to avoid addressing the impotence of an abstract right.     
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B. A Balanced Measure of Justice  
 
“Proportionality” is most easily understood to be a standard that requires the 
judicial sanction to “fit” the legal harm.41  While no clear definition of proportionality 
emerges from the Supreme Court cases, the basic meaning is balance or equilibrium.42  
Proportionality addresses the measure, degree, or magnitude of the remedy and 
prohibits extreme measures that do not fit the harm.43  Metaphorically, proportionality 
holds that “one should not use a sledge hammer to crack a nut when a nutcracker will 
suffice.”44  As explained in the Magna Carta, “a free man shall not be fined for a small 
offence, except in proportion to the measure of offence; and for a great offence he shall 
be fined in proportion to the magnitude of the offence.”45  The same concept appears 
even earlier in the Code of Hammurabi and the Old Testament as the principle of lex 
talionis—an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth.46  Proportionality thus seeks the perfect 
balance between right and remedy. 
In the remedial context, proportionality generally is applied in a mechanical way 
to require that a judicial remedy be properly related in size or degree to the wrong.  The 
decisionmaker searches for the precise balance between the defendant’s harm and the 
plaintiff’s remedy in order to avoid excess, gain, or windfall on either side.  Equilibrium 
thus emerges as the hallmark of proportionality, evoking visions of the balanced scales 
of justice.47  As Justice Scalia so aptly noted, it is the balanced scale, and not the 
seesaw, that has come to serve as the icon of neutral and rational decisionmaking.48 
Proportionality analysis at times resembles cost-benefit analysis, whereby the 
court weighs the benefits and burdens between the parties.  In this utilitarian sense, 
proportionality searches for a proper fit or relationship between ends and means.49  
                                                 
41 Gunn, supra note 3, at 466.   
42 See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: 
“Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 573-74 (2004) (“Indeed, no clear definition 
of proportionality can be found in any of the Court’s non-capital cases.”); Gunn, supra note 3, at 468 
(“The word ‘proportionality’ has been adopted to encapsulate core values with broad implications, but 
whose actual meaning can be maddeningly vague and even incoherent.”); accord Zoller, supra note 3, at 
580. 
43 See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575, 596, 600 (1996) (discussing the proportionality standard as 
an assessment of the proper degree and measure of punitive damages); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. 
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 478 (1993) (citing case from 1813 addressing the moderate remedy “proper to the 
magnitude and manner of that offence”) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
44 Gunn, supra note 3, at 466-67; Zoller, supra note 3, at 580 (noting the nutcracker metaphor of 
proportionality in the British courts and the cannon metaphor from a Swiss jurist:  “You must not shoot 
sparrows with cannons.”). 
45 Magna Carta, Art. 20.  
46 See infra discussion at 44.  
47 Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L. J. 263, 280 (2005) 
(quoting Emmanuel Kant: “But what kind and what degree of punishment does justice take as its 
principle and its norm?  None other than the principle of equality in the movement of the pointer on the 
scales of justice.”). 
48 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1992). 
49 Frase, supra note 42, at 595-97.  Utilitarianism searches for the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number, and thus will balance to incorporate the interests of all concerned.  See Ristroph, supra note 47, 
at 272. 
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Costs and benefits are weighed by considering the gravity of the harm and the 
alternative governmental responses.  A governmental measure may be disproportionate 
in a utilitarian sense when the measure’s costs and burdens outweigh the likely benefits, 
or when the measure is more burdensome than some alternative means.50  However, 
proportionality is a standard of judicial review “that is more elaborate and sophisticated, 
but also more intrusive and aggressive, than the traditional means-end test.”51  Thus, it 
may consider a range of other issues like federalism, institutional competencies, and the 
appropriateness of judicial deference to other institutions.52   
Theoretical notions of balance as justice are evident in legal theories ranging 
from the very earliest to the most recent of times.  Justice, as envisioned by both 
Aristotle and law and economics theorists, focuses on balance as a proxy for fairness 
and appropriate judicial action.  Aristotle considered justice as a concept of balance 
between the extremes of excess and deficiency that equalizes the positions of the 
parties.53  Equality between the parties is determined by a “mean,” or intermediate state, 
which lies between the extreme vices of deficiencies or excess.54  “Justice is a certain 
kind of mean condition, . . . concerned with a mean quantity, while injustice is 
concerned with extreme quantities.”55  Justice is thereby portrayed as a norm of fairness 
achieved through a mathematical function.56  “What is just in transactions is something 
equitable, . . . according to an arithmetic proportion.”57   Justice is accomplished by 
finding the right mean between gain and loss that achieves an arithmetic ratio of one to 
one.58  This arithmetic ratio of justice requires the judge to “even things up” by 
adjusting unbalanced gain and loss into equal halves.59  “Whenever neither more nor 
less results,” each party has what is justly theirs.60  Thus, Aristotle’s philosophy focuses 
on striking a careful balance and equilibrium between the parties to achieve justice.  
Excess or gain to either side is considered the antithesis of a just or fair result.61 
Aristotle’s vision of corrective justice as a restoration of proportion between 
parties after a wrong is one justification offered in support of the proportionality rule in 
the area of compensatory damages.62  “Corrective justice theory is based on a simple 
and elegant idea: when one person has been wrongfully injured by another, the injurer 
                                                 
50 Frase, supra note 42, at 595-97.   
51 Zoller, supra note 3, at 571. 
52 Gunn, supra note 3, at 466-67. 
53 ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, Ch. 5 (Joe Saches, trans. 2002); see Sarah Cravens, 
Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an Opportunity for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1637, 
1642 (2005). 
54 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, Book V, Ch. 5, 1134a; see Ernst J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. 
REV. 403 (1992). 
55 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, Book V, Ch. 5, 1134a (“And injustice is the opposite in relation to what is 
unjust, and this is excess and deficiency of what is beneficial or harmful, contrary to proportion.”). 
56 Id. at 1132a; see Weinrib, supra note 54, at 404 (“In Aristotle’s account, fairness as a norm is 
inseparable from equality as a mathematical function.”). 
57 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, Book V, Ch. 4, 1132a. 
58 Id. at 1132al18-20. 
59 Id. at 1132a25-32. 
60 Id. at 1132bl13-15. 
61 Id. at 1134al1-12. 
62 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 17 (3d ed. 2002). 
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must make the injured party whole.”63  The corrective justice principle of equilibrium, 
sometimes referred to as the “rightful position,” requires that damages return the 
plaintiff to the position she would have been but for the harm.64  To do less would leave 
part of the harm unremedied, whereas doing more would confer a windfall gain to the 
plaintiff.65  The bipolarity of corrective justice requires that the “defendant must pay not 
just any amount, but the amount of the plaintiff’s injury, because the payment is not a 
penalty per se, but the rectification of an injury that the defendant inflicted.”66 
Theoretical support for a proportionality rule of remedies is also found in 
modern law and economics.  The Coase Theorem reduces the question of balance to a 
level of bargaining between the parties.67  Parties should bargain freely to resolve legal 
disputes based on economic efficiency.  A rule of precise remedial measurement creates 
incentives for defendants to act efficiently.  The basic principle is that to achieve 
appropriate remedial goals, “injurers should be made to pay for the harm their conduct 
generates, not less, not more.”68  If the remedy is “higher or lower than the harm, 
various undesirable social consequences will result.”69   
 
If injurers pay less than for the harm they cause, underdeterrence may 
result—that is, precautions may be inadequate, product prices may be too 
low, and risk-producing activities may be excessive.  Conversely, if 
injurers are made to pay more than for the harm they cause, wasteful 
precautions may be taken, product prices may be inappropriately high, 
and risky but socially beneficial activities may be undesirably curtailed.70 
 
Thus, the law should seek a perfect balance between parties to achieve economic 
efficiency.   
 Balancing to achieve economic efficiency operates similarly in the context of 
preliminary injunctions.  “The traditional preliminary injunction rule employs a 
balancing of irreparable harm designed to minimize expected error costs.”71  The court 
compares “the harm to plaintiff if preliminary relief is erroneously denied and the harm 
to defendant if preliminary relief is erroneously granted.”72  If there is an excess of harm 
to plaintiff, the preliminary injunction will be granted.  Prior to the entry of a final 
judgment, “individual incentives to behave efficiently are distorted by uncertain legal 
                                                 
63 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L. J. 695, 695 (2003). 
64 LAYCOCK, supra note 62, at 17. 
65 Id.  
66 Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 63, at 701. 
67 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56-58 (5th ed. 1998).  
68 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
869, 871 (1998). 
69 Id. at 878. 
70 Id.; see also POSNER, supra note 67, at 197-99. 
71 Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the 
Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381, 396 (2005). 
72 Id.; see John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 541 (1978). 
REMEDIAL PROPORTIONALITY 
 11
entitlements.”73  When rights are uncertain, parties discount the harm caused to others.74  
Preliminary injunctions correct this distortion by counteracting the bias toward 
infringement, realigning the balance to promote efficiency.75  Proportionality or 
equivalence between the parties under the law creates the proper incentives for parties 
to operate economically efficiently. 
 
C. The Three Bears Theory of Redress  
 
The proportionality principle of remedies and its search for balance can be 
thought of as the “Three Bears” theory of redress: the proper remedy is that which is not 
too big, not too small, but just right.  Like Goldilocks searching for the perfect bowl of 
porridge, courts search for the perfect remedy by trying out different remedial choices.  
This version of proportionality resonates with the Supreme Court, which has utilized it 
as the guiding principle in deciding remedial questions over the past five years.  
For example, in Kansas v. Colorado,76 Justices Thomas and Stevens used Three 
Bears language to describe their dissenting opinions regarding the proper measure of 
damages computed as prejudgment interest.  The case, on its fourth appeal to the Court, 
involved Colorado’s breach of the Arkansas River Compact beginning in 1950, and the 
proper determination of the principal upon which prejudgment interest would be 
computed.77  In a prior appeal, “Colorado attacked the award of any prejudgment 
interest, while Kansas called for full prejudgment interest.”78  The Court adopted the 
special master’s “equitable compromise,” awarding prejudgment interest beginning in 
1985, when Colorado first filed its complaint.79  Kansas then sought post-1985 interest 
computed upon all damages since 1950, which the Court dismissed as an attempt to 
convert a “modest adjustment” of prejudgment interest into a windfall to the plaintiff.80  
The majority thus held that prejudgment interest applied only to damages incurred after 
1985.81  Justice Stevens dissented, stating that “[t]he fact that Kansas’ request represents 
too large a measure of damages does not convince me that Kansas is entitled to no 
interest for damages prior to 1985.”82  Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent, criticized 
the Court for its “equitable compromise” of the past that created the further uncertainty 
in the pending case:  “The Court must again decide what is too little or too much 
compensation for Colorado’s depletion of the Arkansas.”83   
                                                 
73 Id. at 382. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 393-94. 
76 543 U.S. 86 (2004). 
77 Id. at 90. 
78 Id. at 96; see Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 14 (2001). 
79 543 U.S. at 96. 
80 Id.  Kansas’ argument would have converted the $38 million damages into an award of $53 million. 
81 Id. at 98.   
82 Id. at 109 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Stevens would have computed interest from 1969 forward, 
representing the time Colorado knew, or should have known, it was violating the compact. 
83 Id. at 107 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  Justice Thomas thought that no prejudgment 
interest should be available because neither the contract nor the common law at the time of the contract 
formation authorized such relief.  Id. at 106. 
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Justice Thomas utilized Three Bears reasoning again, this time writing for the 
Court, in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC.84  In eBay, the Court overturned a 
permanent injunction issued by the appellate court to protect a business-method patent 
that defendant eBay had infringed on its successful auction website.85  The Court was 
concerned that each party sought extreme positions as plaintiffs argued patent holders 
were always entitled to equitable relief in addition to damages and defendants argued 
injunctions were never appropriate.86  Thomas criticized the Federal Circuit for granting 
too much relief by establishing a categorical rule under which patent holders were 
always entitled to an injunction.87  He also chastised the district court for erring “in the 
opposite direction” by awarding too little relief by holding that business-method patent 
holders never need an injunction because they could always remedy their loss with 
damages.88  The Supreme Court in eBay thus eschewed the “broad classifications” and 
“expansive principles” at the far ends of the remedial spectrum, reiterating the 
importance of balance between interests as necessary to determining the remedy that is 
just right in each case.89    
Three Bears reasoning appeared more subtly in the Court’s analysis of equitable 
restitution.90  In Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, the Court, in a 5-4 
decision, limited the Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s statutory 
authorization of “equitable” relief to claims for constructive trust and equitable lien.91  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, used a historical approach to interpret 
“equitable” in the text of the federal benefits statute to include only those equitable 
remedies “typically available in equity . . . during the days of the divided bench.”92 The 
effect of this decision was to preclude reimbursement to the company from its insured 
for funds advanced for medical treatment and then later recovered by the insured from a 
                                                 
84 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).   
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 1839.  The American Bar Association in its amicus brief in eBay asked the high court to uphold 
the Federal Circuit’s automatic rule for injunctions.  See Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, ABA J. 51, 53 
(Sept. 2006).    
88 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840. 
89 Id. at 1840-41.  However, the remaining Justices indicated in two separate concurrences that they 
differed on how that balance should be applied in the case.  Chief Justice Roberts thought the balance 
tipped in favor of the patent holders.  Id. at 1841-42.  Justice Kennedy thought the balance was in favor of 
the company commercializing the process.  Id. at 1842.  For more on the eBay concurrences see 
discussion infra at 28.    
90 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002). 
91 Id. at 214.  Justice Scalia admitted that “our cases have not previously drawn this fine distinction 
between restitution at law and restitution in equity. . . .”  Id. 
92 Id. at 210, 212.  See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s 
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003) (arguing that 
Congress intended ERISA to incorporate the long history of trust remedy law authorizing reimbursement 
actions); Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063 (2003) 
[hereinafter Reinvents Restitution] (criticizing Scalia’s historical approach and creation of an unworkable 
standard); Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577, 1616-22 
(2002) (arguing that the Court incorrectly classified the relief requested as restitution, misread historical 
practice, and suggesting that a claim for specific money in defendant’s possession like Great-West 
brought was always equitable restitution). 
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third-party tortfeasor.93  Scalia was not moved by pleas from the insurance company 
that his narrow historical rule left plan providers with too little relief.94   Due to the 
operation of federal preemption laws, the insurance company would be left with no 
alternative remedy under state law, thus making standard insurance subrogation clauses 
unenforceable.95   The Court’s restriction on the statutory remedial power was 
motivated by the perception that the plaintiff insurance company was overreaching by 
arguing for a definition of “equitable” relief that acted as a catchall provision for all 
monetary relief.96  Justice Stevens, on the other hand, criticized the majority’s “current 
reluctance to conclude that wrongs should be remedied.” 97 
These cases thus demonstrate the machinations of balance inherent in the 
proportionality standard.  The proportionality rule seeks a precise balance between the 
right and remedy as a proxy for fairness and justice.  Applying this rule consistently and 
clearly, however, has proved elusive. 
 
 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF REMEDIAL PROPORTIONALITY  
 
 A journey through the Supreme Court’s decisions since 2000 reveals a 
mishmash of cases on remedies.  These cases, addressing punitive damages, injunctions, 
and legislative remedies, share a governing rule of proportionality, which the Court 
applies to curtail the remedies available to courts and petitioners.98  As Professor 
Andrew Siegel has noted, “the Court’s ire falls indiscriminately on those advocating for 
the availability of a remedy.”99  This section explores the Court’s reasoning in remedial 
proportionality decisions, and synthesizes the opinions to reveal the common principles 
guiding proportionality analysis.   
                                                 
93 Id. at 208-09. 
94 Id. at 220  
95 Id. at 220-21.  See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 
347-48 (2002) (“Some may not be greatly concerned about the inability of a benefits plan to enforce its 
right to subrogation against a woman left quadriplegic by a serious accident.  But as a result of this 
decision, benefit plans under ERISA may in the future be reluctant to make payments to injured 
individuals because of the uncertainty that subrogation rights will be enforceable.”). 
96 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210.  
97 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 223.  Justice Ginsburg also dissented, and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter 
and Breyer, criticized the majority for its “antiquarian inquiry” that needlessly obscured the meaning and 
application of the statute and which was “better left to the legal historians.”  Id. at 224, 233-34.  Four 
years later, a unanimous Court in Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., quietly reversed 
positions and granted the insurance company the right to seek reimbursement.  126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006).  In 
a technical opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court authorized reimbursement for most insurance 
companies by labeling the subrogation action as one for “equitable lien.”  Id. at 1875.  The Sereboff Court 
did not address the conflict with its prior holding in Department of the Army v. Blue Fox,  525 U.S. 255, 
264-65 (1999), that equitable liens are essentially actions for money and thus are “legal” rather than 
equitable claims.  See Thomas, Reinvents Restitution, supra note 72, at 1074 (addressing the 
inconsistency between Great-West and Blue Fox).   
98 Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the 
Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1115, 117 (2006).  
99 Siegel, supra note 101, at 1126. 
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 As initially applied by the Court, remedial proportionality was an outer limit 
used to guard against extreme remedial measures or “gross disproportionality.”100  This 
gross excessiveness standard was a variant of the “I know it when I see it” or “shocks 
the judicial conscience” tests used to catch extreme remedial outliers.101  In Pacific 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Court’s first foray into federal substantive 
review of state punitive awards, it applied a “gentle rule” of common-law 
reasonableness to uphold a punitive award 200 times the amount of pecuniary 
damages.102  The Court held that the award did not “cross the line into the area of 
constitutional impropriety” because state law assured the jury award was not grossly 
disproportionate to the severity of the offense or the compensatory damages.”103  Under 
this “weak” remedial proportionality standard, the Court intervened sparingly to keep a 
check on excessive remedies, but otherwise gave due deference to the decisionmaker’s 
expertise and experience.  Judicial review of remedies looked only for extreme 
disproportionality that pushed the limits of legal redress.104 
 In contrast, the proportionality standard of the modern Court has emerged as a 
heightened standard of judicial review that demands conformity to a precise remedial 
measurement.  Rather than cursory oversight to catch excessive remedies at the 
periphery of reasonableness, modern proportionality affirmatively requires reviewing 
courts to demand a more exact remedial fit.  Borrowing from the Court’s terminology in 
criminal punishment cases, this heightened review might be labeled “strict 
proportionality” in that it demands a close fit between harm and remedy.  The remedial 
strict proportionality test requires a close nexus in both method and magnitude between 
the governmental remedial action and operative legal right.  That is, the court’s remedy 
must correspond to the right in both type (method or subject) and amount (magnitude or 
scope). 
 An early example of the development of the Court’s remedial proportionality 
principle can be seen in City of Riverside v. Rivera.105  In Rivera, the plurality and the 
concurring Justice Powell explicitly adopted a proportionality standard for assessing the 
reasonableness of attorney fees in civil rights cases, requiring that fees be proportionate 
to “the results” obtained in the case.106  This fee standard evaluates the magnitude of the 
success, including equitable relief, and furtherance of the “public interest” in balancing 
                                                 
100 See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
101 Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal 
Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 903 (2004).   
102 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 12, 20 (1991).   In Haslip, the insureds sued their 
insurance company for the fraud of its agent in pocketing payments for insurance that had lapsed.  The 
lead plaintiff, Haslip, recovered compensatory damages of $200,000, including $4,000 of pecuniary 
damages for out-of-pocket losses for uninsured medical bills.  Id. at 23. 
103 Id. at 24. 
104 See Karlan, supra note 104, at 903;  see, e.g., TXO, 509 U.S. at 443; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18; St. Louis, 
Iron Mtn. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 
111 (1909).  
105 477 U.S. 561 (1986). 
106 Rivera, 477 U.S. at 579; see Thomas H. McDonough, Recent Decisions, Civil Rights: Third Circuit 
Disallows Use of Proportionality Analysis in Awarding Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Federal Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 449, 468 (1998). 
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the reasonableness of the fees.107  Applying this standard, the Court upheld a fee award 
of $245,456.25 in Rivera where the plaintiffs obtained only $33,350 in compensatory 
and punitive damages108 because the successful race discrimination claim against the 
police department advanced the public interest sufficiently to justify the award.109  Five 
Justices expressly rejected the defendants’ request for a strict mathematical 
proportionality formula that would have limited fees to $11,100, 33% of the monetary 
recovery.110  The Court held that while it was concerned about potential windfalls to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, there were adequate safeguards in place to protect against such 
excess.111  Thus, while the Court rejected a strict proportionality standard demanding a 
close fit between fees and relief, it also moved away from a weak review of gross 
excessiveness advanced by the plaintiffs.  The Court thus began to demand heightened 
judicial oversight measuring the scope of relief.  
 Reviewing the most recent Supreme Court cases on remedies demonstrates to a 
striking degree how the Court has converted proportionality from a limited rule of 
thumb to a universal standard of remedial measurement.  The following section traces 
the evolution of the proportionality standard through the Court’s most recent 
pronouncements.   
 
A. Mathematical Proportionality in Punitive Damages 
 
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has been newly troubled by state court 
awards of punitive damages, finding them, in classic Three Bears fashion, to be simply 
                                                 
107 Rivera, 477 U.S. at 579.  A similar standard appears in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PLRA), which requires that attorney fees be proportionate to the “court ordered relief” in the case.  42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i).  The PLRA thus eliminates from the proportionality rule consideration of the 
advancement of the public interest, otherwise permitted by Rivera, and removes consideration of success 
derived from private settlements.  See Lynn S. Branham, Toothless In Truth? The Ethereal Rational 
Basis Test and The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Disparate Restrictions On Attorney's Fees, 89 CAL. L. 
REV. 999, 1010-11 (2001). 
108 477 U.S. at 579.  But see id. at 587 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“[I]t would be difficult to find a better 
example of legal nonsense than the fixing of attorney's fees by a judge at $245,456.25 for the recovery of 
$33,350 damages.”). 
109 Id. at 579.  However, Justice Powell, the concurring fifth Justice in the case, opined that:  
Where recovery of private damages is the purpose of a civil rights litigation, a district 
court, in fixing fees, is obligated to give primary consideration to the amount of 
damages awarded as compared to the amount sought. In some civil rights cases, 
however, the court may consider the vindication of constitutional rights in addition to 
the amount of damages recovered. . . . It probably will be the rare case in which an 
award of private damages can be said to benefit the public interest to an extent that 
would justify the disproportionality between damages and fees reflected in this case.   
Id. at 585, 586 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).  See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (applying the 
proportionality rule of attorney’s fees to strike down a fee of $280,000 in a case where the plaintiff 
obtained only nominal damages of $1) 
110 477 U.S. at 576, 580 (plurality opinion); id. at 585 (Powell, J., concurring). 
111 Id. at 580. These adequate safeguards included a legal standard permitting only “reasonable” fee 
awards, judicial discretion to deny fees in appropriate cases, and preclusion of fees incurred after a 
pretrial settlement offer greater than the amount recovered at trial.  Id. at 580-81. 
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“just too big.”112  Punitive damages are a discretionary monetary remedy imposed to 
punish a defendant’s unlawful conduct and to deter its repetition.113  The Court has 
expressed concerns with “monstrous awards”114 of punitive damages that “run wild”115 
or are “skyrocketing.”116  The Court is suspicious of state juries and their threat of 
awarding punitives based on “prejudice, bias, and caprice” against big business.117  In 
response, the Court has imposed a rule of proportionality to limit excessive punitive 
awards.   
This modern rule of strict, mathematical proportionality alters the longstanding 
gross excessiveness standard to now require an affirmatively reasonable award, one that 
is just right.  In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, the Court discussed the common-law 
standard from early English times that reviewed damages, both compensatory and 
punitive, for “gross excessiveness,” looking for damages that were so “outrageous” that 
“all mankind at first blush must think so.”118  The Oberg Court struck down an Oregon 
state law that prohibited common-law judicial review and deferred solely to the jury.119  
Since then, the Court’s federal oversight of state punitive awards has developed a more 
demanding measure of punitive relief, requiring a court to pinpoint the precise measure 
on the remedial spectrum that is “reasonable,” rather than merely striking down those 
awards at the unreasonable extremes.120  The practical effect of this stricter standard is 
to overturn more jury awards of punitive damages.   
 
1. Strict Proportionality for Punitives  
 
                                                 
112 See BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979); State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 
(2003); Gore, 517 U.S. at 569; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991). 
114 TXO, 509 U.S. at 473 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Rather than producing a judgment founded on 
verifiable criteria, they produced a monstrous award – 526 times actual damages and over 20 times 
greater than any punitive award in West Virginia history.”)  
115 Gore, 517 U.S. at 598 (Scalia J., dissenting joined by Thomas, J.) (“Today we see the latest 
manifestation of this Court's recent and increasingly insistent ‘concern about punitive damages that 'run 
wild.'’"); TXO, 509 U.S. at 475 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 (“We note once again 
our concern about punitive damages that ‘run wild.’). 
116 Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco, 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, joined by Stevens, J.); see also TXO, 509 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“Recently, however, the frequency and size of such awards have been skyrocketing.”). 
117 TXO, 509 U.S. at 492 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417 (“Jury instructions 
typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a 
defendant’s net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big 
businesses, particularly those without strong local presences.”). 
118 512 U.S. 415, 421-22 (1994) (citing Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (CP 1763)); Karlan, supra 
note 101, at 903 (identifying BMW v. Gore as “transforming the longstanding constitutional principle that 
civil damages awards cannot be ‘grossly excessive’). 
119 Oberg, 512 U.S. at 430. 
120 Id. at 437 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing that the Constitution only 
imposes an “outer limit on remedies” and does not guarantee a “right to a correct determination of the 
reasonableness of a punitive award,” and noting that a violation of “reasonableness” does not establish 
that the award is “grossly excessive.”). 
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The Court’s proportionality rule for punitives requires that the measure of 
punitive damages correspond to the wrongfulness of the conduct:  “[C]ourts must 
ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the 
amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.”121  
Proportionality is determined by use of “three guideposts,” directing judges to examine 
the reprehensibility of the defendant’s action, the amount of harm caused, and the 
societal indication of wrong embodied in other sanctions.122  The ultimate balance 
between the harm caused and appropriate measure of punitives must satisfy a precise 
mathematical ratio between compensatory and punitive damages.123 
This proportionality rule demanding predictable computation of punitives is a 
departure from the common-law theory that punitives should be indeterminate in order 
to effectively punish or deter a defendant.124  The common-law theory ensured that 
defendants could not calculate punitives into the cost of doing business and thereby 
continue to engage in socially undesirable behavior. 125  Punitives internalize the costs 
of reprehensible conduct where the market has failed to deter the rational economic 
actor because the wrongdoing creates only external costs.126  Lack of predictability was 
the true force behind punitive damages, because it prevented reprehensible conduct 
from becoming a rational economic choice.   
Courts traditionally reviewed punitive damages for extreme results falling at the 
outer limits of reasoned judgment.  Using a type of “I know it when I see it” approach, 
courts looked to whether punitive awards “shocked the judicial conscience” or “jarred 
constitutional sensibilities” in deciding whether to overturn the traditional deference to 
the finders of fact.127  In the modern era, however, the Supreme Court has rejected this 
longstanding norm of weak judicial oversight, and instead has adopted a rule of precise 
measurement for punitive damages affirmatively mandating “reasonable” measures. 
                                                 
121 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426. 
122 Id. at 418; BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
123 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424-25 (requiring that punitives be within a range of 2 to 9 times as large as 
compensatory damages).  See discussion infra at 20. 
124 Cf.  Haslip, 499 U.S. at 58-59 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (advocating proportionality for punitives and 
rejecting argument that proper deterrence of corporate wrongdoing necessitates unpredictable and 
disproportionate punitive awards from jury).    
125 Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1467 (D. Haw. 1989) (“Punitive damages serve to deter 
manufacturers as, unlike with compensatory damages, the defendant is prevented from making the 
‘coldblooded calculation’ that it is more profitable to pay claims than correct a defect.”); Palmer v. A.H. 
Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984) (“If punitive damages are predictably certain, they become 
just another item in the cost of doing business, much like other production costs, and thereby induce a 
reluctance on the part of the manufacturer to sacrifice profit by removing a correctible defect.”); see 
Walter Lucas, Op-ed, Punitives Cap Makes Injury a Cost of Doing Business, 138 N.J. L.J. 789, 804 
(1994); Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1393, 1430 (1993). 
126  Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick Fitzgerald, Punitive Damages and the Supreme Court’s Reasonable 
Relationship Test: Ignoring the Economics of Deterrence, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 237, 251 
(2005). 
127 See TXO, 509 U.S. at 443 (plurality opinion); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18. 
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Glimmers of a strict proportionality rule first appeared in 1993, in TXO 
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.128  In TXO, the plurality rejected the 
parties’ request for an absolute test or mathematical bright line that would determine the 
excessiveness of punitive awards.129  The Court rejected each side’s argument as too 
extreme in Three Bears fashion, finding that the plaintiffs asked for too much in seeking 
to uphold any punitive award that legitimately sought to punish or deter, and that 
defendants sought too little relief in seeking to subject all punitives to heightened 
scrutiny.130  Instead, the plurality adopted what has since been labeled a “narrow” 
proportionality test under which it reviewed the punitive damages award for “gross 
excessiveness.”131  The narrow proportionality standard does not mandate a particular 
measure of punitive damages, but rather operates to strike down awards outside the 
zone of reasonableness.  Under this cursory check for excessiveness, a divided Court in 
TXO upheld an award of $10 million in punitives for $19,000 in compensatory 
damages.132  While the actual loss to the plaintiff was low, the Court found that the 
potential loss threatened was several million dollars, and this potential harm, coupled 
with the defendant’s egregious bad faith of bringing false lawsuits against innocent 
business parties, made such an award reasonable.133    
Justice O’Connor, however, criticized this weak standard of review and argued 
for a more principled guide to lower courts as to the arbitrariness of punitive 
damages.134  It was O’Connor’s dissent in TXO, joined by Justices White and Souter, 
that raised the specter of proportionality for punitive damages.135  O’Connor argued that 
the notion of proportionality was implicit in due process as the antithesis of arbitrary 
state action.136  She observed that the “requirement of proportionality is ‘deeply rooted 
and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence.’”137  Strict judicial review of 
punitive damages, O’Connor said, ensured that the “ancient and fundamental principle 
of justice is observed—that the punishment be proportionate to the offense.”138      
 The proportionality rule from O’Connor’s dissent emerged as the majority rule 
just three years later in BMW v. Gore.139   With little explanation, the three split 
                                                 
128 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
129 Id. at 459.   
130 Id. at 456. 
131 Id. at 458. 
132 Id. at 450, 456.  Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality and its invocation of a narrow proportionality 
standard, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun.  Justice Kennedy wrote a 
concurrence criticizing the use of a quantitative rather than qualitative analysis for excessiveness.  Id. at 
466.  Justices Scalia and Thomas, also concurring in the judgment upholding the award, rejected the 
premise that the Constitution grants any power to the Supreme Court to review awards of punitive 
damages.  Id. at 470.     
133 Id. at 462. 
134 Id. at 480 (“In Solomonic fashion, the plurality rejects both petitioner's and respondents' proffered 
approaches, instead selecting a seemingly moderate course.  But the course the plurality chooses is, in 
fact, no course at all.”).    
135 Id. at 478-79 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
136 Id. at 479. 
137 Id. at 478. 
138 Id.  
139 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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opinions of TXO combined to form a rule endorsing a strict proportionality standard for 
punitive damages incorporating both qualitative and quantitative factors.140  In Gore, 
the plaintiff was awarded $2 million dollars for BMW’s fraud of selling a car as new, 
failing to disclose it had been repainted.141  The plaintiff’s damages from the fraud were 
$4,000, the amount of the reduced market value of a “used” car.142  The Court reacted to 
the plaintiff’s windfall for such an inconsequential economic harm by adopting the 
“three guideposts” to guide the courts’ decisions as to a proper measure of punitive 
damages:  punitives must be proportional to 1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
misconduct; 2) the amount of compensatory damages awarded; and 3) the amount of 
other civil sanctions.143  In Gore, like TXO, disproportionality between punitives and 
the amount of harm indicated that the judge should “rais[e] a suspicious eyebrow.”144  
 While the Court found it important to adopt a new, heightened standard of 
proportionality in Gore, the result did not depend upon this standard.  Gore was an easy 
case, as Justice Breyer explained:    
 
[T]he severe disproportionality between the award and the legitimate 
punitive damages objectives reflects a judgment about a matter of 
degree.  I recognize that it is often difficult to determine just when a 
punitive award exceeds an amount reasonably related to a State’s 
legitimate interests, or when that excess is so great as to amount to a 
matter of constitutional concern.  Yet whatever the difficulties of 
drawing a precise line, once we examine the award in this case, it is not 
difficult to say that this award lies on the line’s far side.  The severe lack 
of proportionality between the size of the award and the underlying 
punitive damages objectives shows that the award falls into the category 
of “gross excessiveness” set forth in the Court’s prior cases. 145 
 
Nonetheless, the Court emerged from Gore with a stricter standard of 
proportionality requiring the Court to choose a more precise point along the remedial 
spectrum as to reasonable relief. Rather than merely identifying an award as so severe 
and oppressive as to fall within the zone of arbitrariness as had been done in the past,146 
courts were now instructed to more closely approximate a “reasonable” measure of 
punitive damages. Subsequently, the Court adopted a de novo standard of review for 
punitive awards in order to facilitate the exacting inquiry needed to apply strict 
                                                 
140 Justice O’Connor’s position in TXO quietly won the day as her dissent and Kennedy’s concurrence in 
TXO combined into a five-Justice majority for strict proportionality in the Gore opinion authored by the 
same writer as in TXO, Justice Stevens.   
141 Gore, 517 U.S. at 567. 
142 Id. at 564. 
143 State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003); Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. 
144 Gore, 517 U.S. at 583; TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
145 Gore, 517 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
146 See, e.g, St. Louis Iron M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. 
Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909); see Karlan, supra note 101, at 903. 
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proportionality and avoid the more deferential narrow proportionality standard of 
outlying excessiveness.147 
 In 2003, the Court refined the strict proportionality standard as a mathematical 
ratio in State Farm v. Campbell.148  In State Farm, the Court overturned an award of 
punitive damages in the amount of $145 million for State Farm’s bad faith and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress against one of its insureds.149  State Farm 
covered up the liability of its insured in a fatal car accident, refused to settle for the 
policy limits, and then threatened its own insured, the Campbells, with bankruptcy and 
losing their home.150  The Court identified the legal problem in the case as the 
“imprecise manner” of measuring punitive damages.151  The six-Justice majority had 
“no doubt that there is a presumption against an award that has a 145 to 1 ratio.”152   
 In the past, the Court had consistently rejected pressure to set a concrete 
mathematical formula for the proper measure of punitives.153   
 
Of course, we have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional 
line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that 
compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award. . . . We 
need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line 
between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally 
unacceptable that would fit every case.154 
 
Nevertheless, in State Farm the Court identified a range of concrete ratios of 
appropriate proportional measures of punitive damages.155  The Court suggested that 
“single-digit” multipliers of damages are more likely to comport with due process, and 
that ratios of 4 to 1 were generally defensible.156  It also noted with favor a long 
legislative history of adopting ratios of double, triple, or quadruple damages.157  Thus, 
punitives were largely restricted to 2 to 9 times the amount of compensatory damages 
awarded in a case.158 
                                                 
147 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418; Cooper Industries Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 
(2001). 
148 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 413. 
151 Id. at 417. 
152 Id. at 426.  Chief Justice Rehnquist crossed over in Campbell to embrace the strict proportionality he 
had previously rejected.  Id.  The three dissenters, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg continued to 
believe that proportionality analysis and federal court review of punitive damages was not mandated 
under the Constitution.  See id. at 429-30. 
153 BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996); TXO, 509 U.S. at 458. 
154 Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 458). 
155 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424-25. 
156 Id. at 425. 
157 Id. 
158 There are some exceptions to the mathematical ratio, such as when the conduct is clandestine and 
capable of evading detection, when the compensatory measure is particularly substantial, or when the 
compensatory measure is low but the defendant’s act is egregious.  Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425; see also 
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 State Farm, like Gore, was “neither close nor difficult.”159  The application of a 
narrow proportionality standard of gross excessiveness would have sufficed to 
invalidate the extreme punitive award.   Nevertheless, the Court took the opportunity to 
craft a more stringent standard of proportionality necessitating a careful assessment of 
punitive damages.  The concern with precise, careful measurement and close 
quantitative nexus are all indicative of a strict proportionality standard.   
 
 2.  Proportionality as a Constitutional Mandate for Fairness 
 
 The Supreme Court has located the requirement of proportionality for punitive 
damages in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.160  The Court has 
expressly stated that both procedural and substantive due process guarantees are 
implicated in an excessive punitive award.161  The Due Process Clause prohibits the 
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments:  “The reason is that 
elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that 
a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, 
but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”162  Grounding 
proportionality in constitutional notions of fairness has potentially broad implications, 
as all remedies, not just punitives, may be said to require constitutionally fair results.163   
  Excessive punitive awards are unfair to defendants, according to the Court, 
because they fail procedurally to provide adequate notice to the defendant of the rule of 
law.164  A proportionality rule thus promotes consistency in awards and provides the 
constitutionally-required notice of the potential legal consequences of reprehensible 
conduct.165  Excessive punitives are also unfair to defendants in the arbitrariness of the 
amount of the award.166  Proportionality reins in excess and avoids arbitrary 
governmental action that violates substantive due process.  Conceptualized as a due 
                                                                                                                                               
Matthias v. Accor Lodging Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (discussing the economic bases 
for deviating from a strict mathematical ratio for punitives). 
159 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418; Gore, 517 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
160 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416; Cooper, 532 U.S. at 433-34; Gore, 517 U.S. at 559; TXO, 509 U.S. at 443.  
But see A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal Excessiveness 
Jurisprudence, 79 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1085 (2006) (arguing that the Court’s proportionality rule for 
punitives has no basis in the Due Process Clause). 
161 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416.  Not all Justices, however, agree that the Constitution embodies this 
proportionality principle.  Id. at 429 (Scalia., J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg 
additionally argues that proportionality review is an unjustified intrusion into the province of the state 
governments and thus is not sanctioned by the Constitution.  Gore, 517 U.S. at 607; accord id. at 598 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).   
162 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416. 
163 See Tracy A. Thomas, Restriction of Tort Remedies and the Constraints of Due Process: The Right to 
an Adequate Remedy, 39 AKRON L. REV. 975 (2006) [hereinafter Tort Remedies] (arguing that the Due 
Process Clause requires a floor of a minimally adequate measure of tort damages for plaintiffs); Mark 
Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1093-94 (2005) (endorsing expanded 
substantive due process review to limit tort damages); accord Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due 
Process Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231 (2003). 
164 Id. at 417. 
165 Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
166 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416. 
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process issue, proportionality becomes a tool used to prevent encroachment on 
individual rights.167  
The individual right at issue is the property interest of the defendant.168  Of 
prime concern is when the property interest of the defendant is used to create a windfall 
for the plaintiff.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in State Farm, was 
particularly troubled by the potential duplication of awarding both punitives and 
emotional distress damages:  “Much of the distress was caused by the outrage and 
humiliation the Campbells suffered at the actions of their insurer; and it is a major role 
of punitive damages to condemn such conduct.  Compensatory damages, however, 
already contain this punitive element.”169  In other words, a plaintiff’s emotional 
indignation and the defendant’s reprehensible conduct are merely two sides of the same 
coin: one (the distress) is simply the reaction to the other act (the reprehensible 
conduct).  Thus, the Court intimates that damages based on the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress already compensate for the defendant’s wrongful act.170   
Ultimately, the Court is concerned about the constitutional rights of the 
defendants, particularly those of big corporate defendants that might bear the brunt of 
jurors’ animosity and bias.  The excessive size of many punitive awards, the Court 
states, can be “explained by the jury’s raw, redistributionist impulses stemming from 
antipathy to a wealthy, out-of-state corporate defendant.”171   
 
Corporations are mere abstractions and, as such are unlikely to be 
viewed with much sympathy.  Moreover, they often represent a large 
accumulation of productive resources; jurors naturally think little of 
taking an otherwise large sum of money out of what appears to be an 
enormously larger pool of wealth.  Finally, juries may feel privileged to 
correct perceived social ills stemming from unequal wealth distribution 
by transferring money from “wealthy” corporations to comparatively 
needier plaintiffs.172 
 
The Court justifies its concern for corporate wrongdoers as economically based,  
finding that a corporation’s “status as an active participant in the national economy 
implicates the federal interest in preventing individual States from imposing undue 
                                                 
167 Ristroph, supra note 47, at 292-93. 
168 Id. at 298. 
169 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426.   
170 In concluding that punitive damages were redundant with compensatory non-economic damages, 
Justice Kennedy relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states: “In many cases in which 
compensatory damages include an amount for emotional distress, such as humiliation or indignation 
aroused by the defendant’s act, there is no clear line of demarcation between punishment and 
compensation and a verdict for a specified amount frequently includes elements of both.”  Id. § 908, cmt. 
c (1977); see Michael B. Kelly, Do Punitive Damages Compensate Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1429, 1430 (2004) (explaining how punitive damages originated as a way to justify jury awards that 
exceeded tangible losses, and that such a need disappeared when the law began to compensate for insult, 
indignity, and distress). 
171 TXO, 509 U.S. at 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
172 Id.  at 491 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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burdens on interstate commerce.”173  Among other concerns, Justice O’Connor noted 
how the threat of enormous punitive damage awards has a detrimental effect on the 
research and development of new products.174  These national concerns, as well as 
concerns under the fairness guarantees of the Due Process Clause, thus weigh in favor 
of protecting defendants from untoward remedial consequences.  
 
B. Reining in Injunctions   
 
In the context of injunctions, proportionality again operates to limit the remedial 
power of the court.  Proportionality is explained as a mechanism to rein in the expansive 
power of lower court outlaws who engage in judicial policymaking through broad 
injunctive relief.  The proportionality principle manifests itself as a doctrinal rule 
requiring that the scope of the injunction match the scope of the harm.175  
Proportionality for injunctive relief, the Court has stated, derives from the inherent 
concept of fairness embodied in equity that balances all of the interests in a remedial 
calculation.176  However, proportionality is a one-way street:  it is used to protect 
defendants against disproportionate remedies, but plaintiffs do not receive comparable 
protection.   
 
1. Developing Standards of Proportionality 
 
As with punitive damages, proportionality for injunctions has evolved from 
weak oversight to a strict standard of review.  The Court developed its rule of 
proportionality for injunctions in the school desegregation cases.177  Law professors 
summarizing these cases view the structural injunctions as “the most untailored remedy 
imaginable”178 and assumed that the Court had abandoned any effort to cabin equitable 
                                                 
173 BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996). 
174 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O’Connor, J. dissenting) (“Some manufacturers of prescription 
drugs, for example, have decided that it is better to avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a new pill or 
vaccine into the market.  Similarly, designers of airplanes and motor vehicles have been forced to 
abandon new projects for fear of lawsuits that can often lead to awards of punitive damages.”). 
175 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 84 (1995). 
176 See, e.g, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971) (“However, in seeking 
to define the scope of remedial power or the limits on remedial power of courts in an area as sensitive as 
we deal with here, words are poor instruments to convey the sense of basic fairness inherent in equity.  
Substance, not semantics, must govern.”). 
177 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.  
178 See Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term--Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger 
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 55 (1982) (noting the Court has "more or less given up the effort" of forming 
any "systematic substantive limitations on the scope of relief"); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 
Term – Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 46 n.94 (1979); Friedman, supra note 31, at 
747 (arguing that the right-remedy test is "vague and somewhat indeterminate” and permits courts “to do 
pretty much what they want"); John Leubsdorf, Completing the Desegregation Remedy, 57 B.U. L. REV. 
39, 83- 85 (1977); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 
30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 715 (1978) (critiquing the right-remedy connection as "indeterminate").  Professor 
Fiss supported this type of untailored relief, calling for judges to exercise their discretion and flexibility 
for the public good.  Fiss, supra, at 46.  
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remedial discretion within the right-remedy proportionality nexus.179  What was at play, 
however, was a weak proportionality standard under which the Court cursorily reviewed 
lower court injunctions for excess.  The Court utilized a weak proportionality or “right-
remedy” standard which gave great weight to the lower court’s factfinding expertise and 
determination of a fair remedy.180  Under this weak standard, most, but not all, of the 
school desegregation case challenges were upheld.181 
The watershed change in the application of the proportionality standard for 
injunctions came in Missouri v. Jenkins.182  The four dissenting Justices, led by Justice 
Souter, struggled to retain the weak proportionality standard under which injunctions 
would be reviewed only for “exceptional circumstances” or “obvious error.”183  The 
majority, however, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted a stronger 
proportionality standard under which it overturned the lower court injunction, ordering 
salary increases for school personnel and state funding for remedial achievement 
programs.184  Justice Thomas, concurring in Jenkins, revealed the extent to which the 
Court’s holding departed from its past application of weak proportionality in the 
injunction context.  He argued that remedial decrees had gotten out of hand, and that 
“the time has come for us to put the genie back in the bottle.”185  Thomas argued that 
the Court should “demand that remedial decrees be more precisely designed” to avoid 
the type of “hit-or-miss method” of shaping remedies that had been employed in the 
past.186  This demand for a reasonable, carefully tailored remedy signaled the advent of 
strict remedial proportionality.  Applying this strict standard, it appears that defendants 
usually win. 
 
2. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 
 
                                                 
179 Chayes, supra note 177, at 55.  
180 See Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 
HASTINGS L.J. 475, 540 (1999) [hereinafter Public Law Remedies] (discussing the Court’s adoption of an 
indeterminate right-remedy test); Kent Roach, The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of 
Equity in Constitutional Remedies, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 859, 859-60 (1991) (discussing the weak standard of 
review for injunctions under which “[r]emedies are reviewed deferentially only to determine if there was 
an abuse of discretion and the trial judge is allowed to balance all the competing equities that are 
presented in the circumstances of the particular case.”). 
181 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1988) (Milliken II) (upholding remedial education 
programs to remedy school segregation); Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 (permitting federal courts to order 
busing, student ratios, and attendance zones to desegregate schools); United States v. Montgomery 
County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969) (upholding mathematical ratios to desegregate faculty and 
staff); but see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I) (invalidating desegregation 
injunction that reached non-party suburban school districts). 
182 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
183 Id. at 138-39, 157 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
184 Id. at 73, 78-79. 
185 Id. at 123 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
186 Id. at 135, 137 (Thomas, J., concurring).  In arguing for a strict proportionality standard, Justice 
Thomas pointed out the lack of teeth in a weak proportionality standard: “If the standard reduces to what 
one believes is a ‘fair’ remedy, or what vaguely appears to be a good ‘fit’ between violation and remedy, 
then there is little hope of imposing the constraints on the equity power that the Framers envisioned and 
that our constitutional system requires.”  Id. at 134. 
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In the new millennium, the injunctive proportionality tale told by the Supreme 
Court is a story of good defendants, bad overreaching plaintiffs, and ugly overzealous 
courts.  In this narrative, plaintiffs, often aided by the courts, reach for the moon, 
seeking social justice and windfall gains at the expense of overtaxed defendants.  
Concerns about the consequences of the injunction for the defendants, who are more 
often than not institutional actors, drive the decisions.  Inverting the normal balance of 
plaintiffs deserving vindication from wrongdoing defendants, these cases portray 
proportionality as a tool to restore justice for defendants.  
 
The Good:  Overburdened Defendants:  Remedial injunctive proportionality 
cases are striking due to the Court’s concern for the interests of the established 
wrongdoer.  The individual freedom of the defendants emerges as a key factor in 
measuring the appropriate proportion of injunctive relief.  The theoretical origins of 
such a heightened standard are left unstated.  Perhaps it is merely a doctrinal leftover 
from the First Amendment overbreadth context.  Proportionality for injunctions 
originated in the prior restraint cases of overbreadth, in which the Court sought to 
protect the First Amendment rights of the defendant.187  Perhaps it is the unique status 
of injunctive relief which operates prospectively to restrict the future freedom of the 
defendant.  The restriction on behavior that may or may not be illegal, the potential for 
contempt penalties, and the possible curtailment of defendants’ otherwise efficient 
behavior may counsel in favor of respecting their interests in the remedial calculus.188   
The Court’s explanation for its heightened standard is based on pragmatic 
concerns for the institutional actors who serve as defendants in these cases.   At times 
this institutional concern manifests as practical management issues governing the 
expertise of the defendant in handling the day-to-day affairs of the institution.189  At 
other times the institutional concern is translated as one of federalism, both horizontal 
and vertical, when courts assume responsibilities granted to another branch of 
government.190  It is clear that the Court is reluctant to direct the activities of 
institutional and corporate defendants, despite their proven wrongdoing. 
                                                 
187 See Zoller, supra note 3, at 50 (“If an analogy to the [international] proportionality principle had to be 
found in current American law, the closest would be the overbreadth doctrine that comes into play to 
invalidate laws that sweep in too much speech.”).  For example, in the recent case of Tory v. Cochran, the 
Court used proportionality to invalidate an injunction in a defamation action preventing all future speech 
about the infamous lawyer, Johnnie Cochran, by a former client.  544 U.S. 734, 736 (2005).  After 
Cochran’s death, the Court found the injunction to be “an overly broad prior restraint upon speech, 
lacking plausible justification.”  Id. at 738; see also Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753 
(1994) (invalidating parts of injunction restricting behavior of abortion protestors on grounds that 
injunction interfered with protestors’ First Amendment rights). 
188 See LAYCOCK, supra note 62. 
189 See, e.g., Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 220. 
190 See, e.g., Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 131-35 (Thomas, J., concurring); Parker, supra note 179, at 540 (stating 
that most often federalism is shown by deference to the defendants in school desegregation cases); but see 
Siegel, supra note 98 (suggesting that Court’s main theme is not driven by federalism, despite the 
frequent cites to federalism concerns, but instead by hostility to litigation). 
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The Court began to develop this tale of the good defendant in the school 
desegregation cases.191  In these cases, it began to establish the doctrinal rules 
embodying the juridicial concern for defendants.  Under these rules, defendants are 
given the first opportunity to remedy the harm or to craft an appropriate remedial 
plan.192  If the defendants fail in that voluntary effort, then the court must weigh 
carefully the interests of the institutional defendants in managing their own affairs in the 
remedial process.193  For example, in Lewis v. Casey, the detailed prison law library 
injunction failed not just because it was overbroad, but also because it failed to accord 
proper deference to the judgment of prison administrators and to give them a first 
opportunity to correct their errors.194   
Modern cases of remedial proportionality in injunctions demonstrate continued 
deference to defendants and a heightened concern for their interests.   For example, in 
Sherrill, the Court highlighted the interests of the city from whom the Oneida tribe was 
seeking tax immunity as a basis for denying the injunctive relief.195  The Court was 
concerned about the impact of a contrary decision upon the city, which had relied upon 
the non-Indian status of the land for more than 200 years, building its city, developing 
its zoning, and relying upon the tax base.196  Technically, the Court effectuated this 
concern through the doctrinal vehicle of laches, reasoning that New York’s two 
centuries of continuous regulatory jurisdiction created “justifiable expectations” on the 
part of the city, buttressed by the Oneida’s delay in asserting their claims:  “The long 
history of state sovereign control precludes the Oneida from rekindling embers of 
sovereignty that long ago grew cold.”197   The majority stated that allowing tax 
immunity for the Oneida’s parcels would “seriously burden the administration of state 
and local governments and would adversely affect landowners neighboring the tribal 
patches.”198  The Court framed this as an “impracticality” defense to the injunction, 
finding that it was impractical to return to Indian control land that generations earlier 
passed into numerous private hands.199 
Similarly, in Ayotte, the Court relied upon the interests of the defendant to deny 
the broad injunction.200  The proportionality calculus was driven by the Court’s 
overriding concern for the institutional defendant, the New Hampshire legislature.  It 
identified “three interrelated principles informing its decision,” all of which pertained to 
the defendant.201  First, the Court stated, it tries not to nullify more of a legislature’s 
                                                 
191 See Parker, supra note 189, at 534-35 (exploring the dominant deference to defendants in school 
desegregation cases).   
192 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978). 
193 “[F]ederal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and local 
authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution.”  Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 88; 
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977). 
194 Jenkins, 518 U.S. at 361-62. 
195 544 U.S. 197, 220 (2005). 
196 Id. at 220-21. 
197 Id. at 214. 
198 Id. at 220. 
199 Id. at 219. 
200 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006). 
201 Id. at 967. 
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work than is necessary, for such a ruling frustrates the intent of the elected 
representatives of the people.202  Second, the Court attempts to avoid devising a judicial 
remedy that essentially rewrites state law, “mindful that our constitutional mandate and 
institutional competence are limited.” 203  It held that such remedial “line-drawing” was 
“inherently complex” and a “serious invasion of the legislative domain.”204  Third, the 
Court held that the “touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent, for a 
court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.”205  
Ultimately, the Court viewed its most important remedial restraint as the proper respect 
of a federal court for the institutional functioning of the state legislature, despite the 
unconstitutional actions of that legislature.    
 
The Bad: Overreaching Plaintiffs:  The second character in the Court’s tale of 
injunctive proportionality is the overreaching plaintiff.  The Court is often explicit in 
stating its belief that plaintiffs overreach by requesting excess relief.  Such excess relief 
produces windfalls to plaintiffs or society beyond what justice requires.  The doctrinal 
rule that an injunctive remedy return a plaintiff to the position she would have occupied 
in the absence of the defendant’s illegal conduct restricts the plaintiff’s ability to receive 
a remedial windfall.206  Plaintiffs are not to obtain an advantage in excess of this 
position, nor is the remedy to benefit third parties not harmed by the conduct at issue.  
Beyond this mechanical doctrinal rule, however, lies a greater suspicion of plaintiffs 
and a distrust of their motivations in the litigation.207 
For example, underlying the Court’s decision in Jenkins, in which it struck down 
an overbroad school desegregation degree, was a belief in the suspect motives of some 
of the parties.  The Court noted the collusion between the parties and the school district 
in using the litigation to leverage funding for improved education.  The school district 
initially filed as a plaintiff along with the parents, though it was later realigned as a 
nominal defendant.  “The KCMSD, which has pursued a ‘friendly adversary’ 
relationship with the plaintiffs, has continued to propose ever more expensive 
programs.”208  The Court accused the parties of bypassing the normal process of 
collective bargaining by colluding in the litigation to obtain higher salaries funded by 
the state.209   
                                                 
202 Id. at 968. 
203 Id.  
204 Id. 
205 Id.  
206 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996); Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 87. 
207 The converse is also true.  Where the Court finds the motives of the plaintiff to be in good faith, it is 
more likely to grant injunctive relief.  See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 
126 S. Ct. 1211, 1220-21 (2006) (upholding preliminary injunction permitting religious sect’s continued 
use of a controlled substance due to their good faith beliefs).   
208 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 79. 
209  Id. at 82 (quoting the dissenting opinion in the appellate court which “characterized the current effort 
by KCMSD and the American Federation of Teachers aided by the plaintiffs to bypass the collective 
bargaining process as uncalled for and probably not an exercise reasonably related to the constitutional 
violations found by the court”). 
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 This collusion led the plaintiffs to continually seek “extravagant,” “elaborate” 
programs designed to obtain one of the best public educations in the nation.210  The 
plaintiffs obtained public schools with air conditioning, a planetarium, greenhouses, a 
model United Nations room, an art gallery, an animal farm, and movie screening 
rooms.211 “The District Court candidly has acknowledged that it has ‘allowed the 
District planners to dream and provide the mechanism for those dreams to be 
realized.’”212  This overreaching was clearly beyond the pale and triggered the 
conclusion of disproportionate relief. 
 The same belief in the corrupt motives of overreaching plaintiffs guided Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay.213  Plaintiff MercExchange won $35 million in 
damages after a jury trial for eBay’s infringement of its business method patent in 
creating the eBay on-line auction company.214  MercExchange then sought an injunction 
prohibiting eBay’s use of the patent in the future.215  The parties had previously tried to 
reach a licensing agreement permitting eBay’s use of the on-line method, but were 
unsuccessful.216 
 Four concurring justices wrote separately to express concerns over the the 
potential overreaching of the plaintiff.217  These Justices identified the plaintiff as one of 
a new breed of “patent trolls,” who seek to enforce a patent in area where it does not 
actively compete with a product or process.218  In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy 
recognized that “[a]n industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis 
for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”219  
He expressed concerns about a remedial rule that created windfalls to these plaintiffs in 
cases where the patent was only a business method patent, and “when the patented 
invention is but a small component of the product the defendant company seeks to 
produce.”220   For in these cases, the “injunction is employed simply for undue leverage 
in negotiations” by threatening to close down the defendant’s entire business.221  For 
                                                 
210 Id. at 98-99. 
211 Id. at 79, 92.  
212 Id. at 80. 
213 eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  In contrast, the concurrence by Chief Justice 
Roberts noted the respect with which plaintiff patent holders were historically treated under the law in 
generally having their requests for injunctive relief granted.  Id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
214 MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 3d 695, 698 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
215 eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839; see also MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. at 710-11. 
216 The district court noted the acrimony between the parties, commenting that ‘this case has been one of 
the more, if not the most, contentious cases that this court has ever presided over.”  MercExchange, 275 
F. Supp. 2d at 714. 
217 Id. at 1843 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Breyer, J.). 
218 See Seidenberg, supra note 64, at 51, 53.  A “patent troll” is a “nefarious term for businesses that 
produce no products or services and have the sole purpose of obtaining money by licensing patents they 
own and winning infringement lawsuits against others.”  The term was first used in 2001 by in-house 
counsel for Intel Corp. to describe the small companies that were suing Intel for patent infringement.  Id. 
219 eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
220 Id.; see Seidenberg, supra note 64, at 54. 
221 eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842; see Seidenberg, supra note 64, at 54.  However, the flip side of this concern 
with overreaching is the recognition that many “patent trolls” are small inventors whose methods and 
processes have been appropriated by large companies like Microsoft and Intel.  Seidenberg, supra, at 51-
54.  Small inventors often enter into negotiations with large companies to license their inventions.  When 
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Kennedy, this misuse of injunctive relief to garner excessive power in the economic 
arena militated against the issuance of injunctions to future patent trolls.222     
 The character of the overreaching plaintiff appears again in Sherrill.223  The 
Oneida Indian tribe brought a series of cases over several decades trying to reclaim 
ancient tribal lands wrongfully taken by the government.  In a prior decision, the 
Supreme Court held that the tribe had a right to assert damages as compensation for 
lands wrongfully taken.224  Subsequently, the Oneida sought tax immunity for several 
parcels of land the tribe had reacquired from private owners on the open market.  One 
senses that the Court thought the Indian tribe was seeking more than its fair share of 
relief by following a successful bid for damages on a novel claim with yet another 
request for prospective relief.   The Oneida had gone one step too far, and the Court 
would no longer be a willing player in the claim for restorative justice more properly 
addressed in the legislative arena.225  The lone dissenter in Sherrill, Justice Stevens, 
challenged the notion of the excessive plaintiff, stating that “the majority’s fear of 
opening a Pandora’s box of tribal powers is greatly exaggerated.”226  He pointed out the 
inconsistency of previously recognizing the Oneidas as the owners of the land, and their 
attendant right to collect damages for that land, but not permitting them to assert 
injunctive relief as owners of the same land.227  The majority, however, drew a line, 
permitting legal but not equitable relief to prevent an excessive award to the tribe.  
 
 The Ugly: Overzealous Courts:  As the narrative continues, the Supreme Court 
rides in with its white hat of remedial proportionality to save us all from the tyranny of 
overzealous courts.  In this tale, the lower courts are the ugly villains who inflict harm 
with their remedial weapons, using their remedial powers for purposes other than to 
make the plaintiff whole.  The rule of proportionality thus becomes a restriction of the 
equitable power of the courts, rather than a mere balancing of the equities between the 
parties.  It is a rule of restraint limiting the remedial authority of the lower courts.   
 The assumption of the overzealous court gone astray is clear in Jenkins, where 
the majority takes the lower court to task for its indulgence in designing plaintiffs’ 
wish-list relief.  The Court commented that the lower court’s injunction had been 
described as the “most ambitious and expensive remedial program in the history of 
school desegregation.”228  It found that the excessive relief awarded—such as a 
                                                                                                                                               
negotiations break down, the large company proceeds to use the new technology without a license, and 
the small inventor is left with no intellectual property and the high-cost of patent litigation.  Id.   
222 eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842. 
223 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
224 See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 231(1985).  
225 The availability of an alternative remedy in a federal process for placing Indian land in federal trust 
mitigated the Court’s seemingly harsh decision.  See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 20-21.  The Oneida did not 
pursue this option, but nevertheless found relief in subsequent proceedings when on remand, the tribe 
won tax immunity under New York state law that precluded taxation of tribal property owners.  See 
Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). 
226 Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 227 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
227 Stevens found the Court’s legalistic distinction based on law and equity to be unpersuasive.  Id. at 225-
26. 
228 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 78.  
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planetarium and a United Nations room—to encourage public school attractiveness and 
counteract white flight was judicial policymaking rather than proper remedial 
decisionmaking.229  As Justice O’Connor articulated in her concurrence, “[t]he 
necessary restrictions on our jurisdiction and authority contained in Article III of the 
Constitution limit the judiciary’s institutional capacity to prescribe palliatives for 
societal ills. . . . It is best to leave social problems like education and segregation to the 
legislative branches.”230     
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, was more direct in his attack on the 
lower court.231  He urged the adoption of a proportionality rule to restrain such 
unacceptable use of judicial authority.    
  
It is perhaps not surprising that broad equitable powers have crept into 
our jurisprudence for they vest judges with the discretion to escape the 
constraints and dictates of the law and legal rules.  But I believe that we 
must impose more precise standards and guidelines on the federal 
equitable power . . . to restore predictability to the law and reduce 
judicial discretion.232 
 
Justice Thomas situated the factual debate in the larger critique of lower court 
activism, arguing that courts had more generally veered from the narrow course of 
remedying wrongs.233  Challenging all structural and public law relief as improper, this 
larger criticism reprimands courts for assuming the role of legislatures by essentially 
enacting policy through the award of broad injunctive relief extending beyond the 
contours of the case.234  The theory exemplified by Thomas’ dissent is a federalist 
critique asserting that courts usurp legislative authority by making policy through the 
use of remedial authority.  It takes on legal theorists like Professors Fiss and Chayes, 
who in the 1970s argued that the courts should disconnect right from remedy in order to 
implement moral justice through remedial power and structural injunctions.235  Fiss and 
Chayes argued for remedies that were broader than the legal right in order to elaborate 
and instill new legal norms of social justice.  The federalist critique attacks the ability of 
                                                 
229 Id. at 83 (quoting the dissenting appellate judge’s conclusion that the case “involves an exercise in 
pedagogical sociology, not constitutional adjudication.”).   
230 Id. at 112-13. 
231 Id. at 125 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas stated: “The judicial overreaching we see before us today 
perhaps is the price we now pay for our approval of such extraordinary measures in the past. . . . Judges 
have directed or managed the reconstruction of entire institutions and bureaucracies with little regard for 
the inherent limitations on their authority.” Id. at 125-56. 
232 Id. at 135. 
233 Id. at 131-33 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of 
Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978) and Paul Mishkin, Federal Courts as State 
Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978)). 
234 See, e.g., John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of 
the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1996) (“[T]he essential flaw of judicial management is 
that the Constitution does not permit the federal courts to exercise their remedial powers to engage in the 
structural reform of local institutions and local government.”). 
235 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); 
Fiss, supra note 177, at 1.    
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lower courts to award any type of structural relief beyond correcting the specific past 
harm.236  Proportionality thus has become a doctrinal rule to discredit public law 
injunctions and implement a policy against alleged judicial activism.   
This same attack on overzealous courts has appeared as a motivating factor 
guiding proportionality analysis in recent cases in the Supreme Court.  For example, in 
eBay, the Court chastised the Federal Circuit for altering the centuries-old doctrinal rule 
of balancing the interests to determine injunctive relief.237  The Federal Circuit asserted 
its authority to prioritize patent rights above other legal rights by adopting a categorical 
rule of always granting injunctive relief to patent holders.  Such zeal was quickly 
curtailed by a unanimous Court, which focused on the appellate court’s inappropriate 
assertion of power and authority.238 
The critique of a lower court also dominates the Court’s decision in the 
infamous case of Bush v. Gore.239  In Bush, the Court struck down the Florida Supreme 
Court’s remedy for the undercounting of votes in a presidential election where the 
Florida court ordered the manual recount of votes in designated counties.240  The Court 
found the injunctive remedy to be both arbitrary and disproportional.241  It also reacted 
to the Florida Supreme Court’s zealous assertion of remedial power.  As Professor 
Andrew Siegel surmises, the Justices in the majority “took note of the fact that in 
addition to simply taking jurisdiction over this crucial national issue, the Florida 
Supreme Court had also cheerfully taken up the role of equitable umpire, vesting itself 
with the power to craft ad hoc remedial solutions to a problem the legislature had not 
fully contemplated.”242  In a vigorous dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices 
                                                 
236 See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 133 (Thomas, J., concurring); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) 
(Scalia, J.) (asserting that the actual injury requirement of standing generally limits injunctions to the 
injury in fact). 
237 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2005). 
238 Id.; see id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J. concurring) (agreeing with the rejection of an automatic grant of 
injunction, but arguing that plaintiff patent holders were historically granted such requests for injunctive 
relief).    
239 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  See Siegel, supra note 98, at 1181-82.  Professor Siegel argues that while Bush v. 
Gore might be explained by some of the Justices’ initial animosity to the political result of the Florida 
Court’s decision, there was also “something deeper and more visceral at work.”  Id. at 1181.  The Court 
displayed, “a fundamental hostility toward the role of the Florida Supreme Court took upon itself. . . . 
[T]he majority Justices likely saw a lower court advocating the primacy of a litigation solution to a 
contentious public debate.”  Id.    
240 Bush, 531 U.S. at 111. 
241 The Court found the recount remedy to be arbitrary because it failed to adopt uniform standards for 
designating a valid legal vote.  Id. at 106.  It found the remedy to be disproportional because it ordered 
recounts for overvotes (those ballots for which two votes were made) when the established legal violation 
addressed undervotes (those votes placed that were not tabulated by the machines).  Id. at 107-09.  But 
see Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass of Bush v. 
Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 388-98 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s suggested 
remedy of requiring detailed safeguards for the recount and changes in the voting laws was 
disproportional). 
242 Siegel, supra note 98, at 1182. “For many—perhaps most – Justices throughout our history, the role 
assumed by the Florida justices might not have seemed extraordinary.  But for the five Justices who drove 
the tempo and timbre of the Rehnquist Court agenda, the Florida Supreme Court’s embrace of such a role 
was a provocative act, one guaranteed to raise their hackles.”  Id. 
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Ginsburg and Breyer, argued that the majority’s distrust of the remedial power of lower 
courts threatened the rule of law:  
 
What must underlie petitioners’ entire federal assault on the Florida 
election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality 
and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if 
the vote count were to proceed. . . . The endorsement of that position by 
the majority of this Court can only lend credence to the most cynical 
appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land.  It is confidence in 
the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true 
backbone of the rule of law. . . . Although we may never know with 
complete certainty the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the 
identity of the loser is perfectly clear.  It is the Nation’s confidence in the 
judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.243 
 
Bush v. Gore is thus another example where the remedial balance of proportionality was 
skewed by the perception of the implementing court as not deserving of credit for 
effectuating justice.  The Florida court was undeserving of deference because of its 
attempt to control a national election beyond the contours of its state power.  
 The most recent U.S. Supreme Court cases on injunctive relief thus reveal 
prevalent judicial concerns for defendants and the potential consequences of 
disproportionate awards of injunctive relief.  Seeking a balance between the plaintiff’s 
deficiency and the potential excess, the Court has tilted the balance in favor of 
respecting defendants’ interests in the computation of judicial redress.  Factoring in a 
distrust for overzealous courts, the Supreme Court has been vigilant in strictly 
scrutinizing the injunctive relief developed by these courts, rather than according them 
traditional deference under a weak proportionality standard.  This same use of strict 
remedial proportionality appears in the Court’s cases addressing legislative remedies 
enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
C. Congruent and Proportional Legislative Remedies Under Section 5 
 
 Statutory remedies enacted by Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment offer another example of the Court’s move towards remedial 
proportionality.  Section 5 provides that Congress may “enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions” of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Court has defined this 
to be only a limited “remedial,” rather than general substantive power.244  The scope of 
these legislative remedies has been determined by the Court to parallel that of judicial 
remedies, and thus these Section 5 remedies add to the remedial story told by the cases 
on punitive damages and injunctions previously discussed.245  Searching for the 
                                                 
243 Bush, 531U.S. at 128-29. 
244 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
245 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997); Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: 
Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 336 
(2004); Zoller, supra note 3, at 578-89; Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 11, at 706-07 (2001); 
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measure of appropriate relief under Section 5, the Court has adopted a principle of 
proportionality to gauge the proper scope of remedial legislation, requiring that the 
legislation exhibit “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented 
or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”246  A “congruent and proportional” 
legislative remedy is one that demonstrates congruence between the means used and the 
ends to be achieved, and is not “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or 
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior.”247  Using this balancing framework, the Court reviews 
Section 5 legislation to make sure it is appropriately tailored and not excessive.  As 
discussed below, the proportionality review is built upon a distrust of Congress and the 
perceived threat to the Court’s ultimate power to define the constitutional law.      
 
 
 
   
 1. A Series of Disproportionate Events 
 
 In six cases over five years, the Supreme Court uniformly struck down Section 5 
legislation in every case it reviewed, consistently finding that the congressional actions 
at issue were disproportionate to the targeted harm.248  Congress’ failure to target its 
prophylactic legislation at an identified constitutional right proved to be the downfall of 
the legislation in most of these cases.249  Congress seemed to be resisting the remedial 
                                                                                                                                               
Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 9, at 469.  Many legal scholars have criticized the Court’s adoption 
of a remedial standard for Section 5, arguing for a broader legislative power.  See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., 
NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 148 (2002) (arguing 
that Section 5 should not be equated with judicial power since the Fourteenth Amendment assigns no 
enforcement role to the Court); Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court’s Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783 (2000) (claiming that the Supreme Court made significant historical errors in 
interpreting Section 5 as a remedial rather than interpretive authority); James W. Fox, Jr., Re-readings 
and Misreadings: Slaugher-House, Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Power, 91 
KY. L.J. 67 (2002) (tracing the history of Section 5 to suggest a source of broad interpretive power); Evan 
H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 
(2001) (arguing that Section 5 should be interpreted according to tests for general Article I power).  
246 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
247 Id. at 532. 
248 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act); Kimel 
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (Trademark Remedy Clarification Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank., 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy 
Clarification Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Religious Freedom Restoration Act).  
249 For example, in City of Boerne, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was invalidated because it 
targeted the non-constitutional harms of zoning, land-use, and fair housing laws.  521 U.S. at 521.  In 
Morrison, Congress misdirected its legislative aim when it sought to remedy the common-law assault 
claims of domestic violence lacking constitutional protection.  529 U.S. at 625-26.  And in both Garrett 
and Kimel, Congress targeted employment practices not prohibited by the federal Constitution.  531 U.S. 
at 366-72; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91; see College Savings, 527 U.S. at 674 (invalidating Trademark Remedy 
Clarification Act because Congress attempted to remedy the non-constitutional, common torts of unfair 
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contours of its designated power by attempting to redefine substantive constitutional 
rights.   
 The development of a proportionality principle in the Section 5 context was thus 
guided by a distrust of Congress and structural concerns regarding interaction among 
Congress, the Court, and the states.250  In one respect, the Court has suspected that 
disproportionate, excessive remedies create a windfall to Congress in allowing it to 
enact legislation beyond its enumerated power.251  Section 5, the Court has held, does 
not authorize substantive legislation regarding legal rights, but only remedial legislation 
responding to existing or threatened violations of constitutional rights.252  Excessive 
remedies under Section 5 threaten to exceed the authorized scope of legislative power:  
“If Congress were permitted to enact rules that it calls ‘prophylactic’ without any 
proportionality review, it could increase its power under Section 5 geometrically.”253  
Proportionality review thus helps to maintain the proper separation of powers at the 
federal level.254     
  
The relation between proportionality and separation of powers should be 
underscored.  It is fundamental to theories of limited government that 
government bodies cannot be trusted to impose and observe limitations 
on their own powers.  Accordingly, limitations on power must come 
from outside the body that exercises power—from the people and from 
other government institutions.  So proportionality as a limit on (for 
example) legislative power cannot be left to legislative determination.255 
 
 Secondly, the Court expressed a structural concern with Congress usurping the 
Court’s power to interpret the Constitution.  “[I]t falls to this Court, not Congress, to 
define the substance of constitutional guarantees.  The ultimate interpretation and 
determination of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive meaning remains the 
province of the Judicial Branch.”256  Commentators have thus concluded that the “Court 
now views Section 5 power as a potential threat to the Court’s role as the ultimate 
                                                                                                                                               
competition and false advertising); Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643 (1999) (invalidating Patent Remedy 
Clarification Act which provides remedies for negligent patent infringement, whereas constitutional Due 
Process is implicated only by intentional patent infringement that is not adequately redressed by the 
state); see also Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 247, at 338 & 338 n.160 (discussing cases). 
250 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 523-23; William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power After Tennessee v. 
Lane, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 40 (2004).   
251 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (finding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 to be “so 
out of proportion” to the objective under the Free Exercise Clause that it could be understood only as an 
attempt to work a “substantive change in constitutional protections.”). 
252 Id. at 519, 521.  
253 Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 9, at 487. 
254 Ristroph, supra note 47, at 287. 
255 Id.  
256 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728; see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 539 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that 
proportionality test of Section 5 is to ensure that Congress does not usurp Court’s responsibility to define 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
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expositor of the constitutional text.”257   The Court’s proportionality approach reflects 
its insistence on primacy in defining constitutional rights, and its unwillingness to defer 
to Congress’ own decisions as to how to wield its remedial power.258    
 The Court has also articulated a third structural concern of vertical federalism 
and Congress’ potential encroachment upon states’ rights.259  In the Section 5 context, 
the Court has endorsed state sovereignty as important to the proportionality calculus.  
Thus, the Court struck down legislation as disproportionate because it lacked a causal 
nexus to the identified constitutional harm, and thus intruded into the governance 
prerogatives of the states.260  This states’ rights agenda dominated much of the 
Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence, both within and outside of the remedial cases.  Indeed, 
the dominant narrative of commentators on the Rehnquist Court tells “the story of a 
Court obsessed with issues of federalism and, more specifically, dedicated to 
recalibrating the balance between federal and state powers so as limit federal authority 
and empower the states.”261  
 Given the overriding structural concerns guiding the Court’s Section 5 
jurisprudence, proportionality was conceptualized as a rule of federalism, renewing the 
historical primacy of states’ rights.  Commentators attacked the proportionality standard 
as a mere pretext for judicial activism and a mechanism to implement the views of the 
conservative Justices on the Court.262  Then, surprisingly, in 2003, the Court upheld 
legislation under Section 5 for the first time in nearly forty years.   
 
 2. Double Take: Upholding Proportional Legislation 
  
 The Court changed course in Nevada v. Hibbs, when it upheld legislation under 
Section 5 for the first time in recent history.263  In Hibbs, the Court upheld the Family 
Medical Leave Act’s private damages provision for employees denied the opportunity 
to take leave from work to care for a family member.  Just one year later, the Court 
again upheld legislation under Section 5, affirming Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act in Tennessee v. Lane.  Commentators once again cried foul, this time 
intimating that nothing but the personal proclivities of the Justices explained the 
                                                 
257  Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric 
Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L. J. 1943, 1945 (2003).  
258 Araiza, supra note 247, at 40. 
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differences in outcomes.264   The Court, however, claimed that it had finally come 
across legislation that was appropriately proportionate to the identified harm.  
 The two cases shared one attribute that seemed to distinguish them from the 
prior Section 5 cases.  In Hibbs and Lane, the legislation implicated the operation of a 
strong, fundamental right that had previously been identified and enforced by the 
Court.265  The Court defined the scope of the “harm” more broadly in these cases than 
in prior cases by identifying legal rights that were at the top of the judicial hierarchy of 
protection – gender equality (Hibbs) and access to the courts (Lane).266  Under a 
proportionality balance, a strong, broadly defined right supports the imposition of 
strong, broadly defined remedies.   
 Hibbs was a relatively easy application of the Section 5 proportionality rule.267  
In a 6-3 decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court upheld the Family 
Medical Leave Act and its authorization of private damages against state employers.268  
The FMLA targeted unconstitutional gender discrimination in the workplace and 
enacted prophylactic measures specifying twelve-week unpaid family leave for both 
sexes to address adverse employment action taken against women.269  The Court found 
the FMLA to be proportionate to the harm because its broad scope of including men and 
mandating specific times addressed widespread gender discrimination and the potential 
reactions from recalcitrant employers to comply with family leave protections for 
women.270   
 Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, changed his vote in Lane, returning to his 
former distrust of congressional legislation.271  The Chief Justice dissented in the 5-4 
decision on grounds that the proportionality standard had been grossly misapplied.272  
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the public accommodation provisions 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act were a valid exercise of Section 5 power.273  The 
majority identified the operative constitutional right as the fundamental right of access 
to the courts, rather than lower-level equal protection right against disability 
discrimination.274   The plaintiffs in the case, a disabled criminal defendant and a court 
reporter, were wheelchair bound paraplegics who had been denied access to a public 
                                                 
264 Editorial, ST LOUIS POST DISPATCH, June 1, 2003, at B2 (“Chief Justice Rehnquist, rumored to be 
considering retirement, may have had his eye on his place in history and softening the edges of his 
regressive legacy.”) 
265 See Araiza, supra note 247, at 40-42. 
266 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728, 735; see Araiza, supra note 247, at 41.  
267 Araiza, supra note 247, at 41-42; see also Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 11, at 730-33 
(predicting that FMLA would be sustained under proportionality test of Section 5). 
268 538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003). 
269 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).   
270 538 U.S. at 735-77. 
271 541 U.S. 509, 538 (2004). 
272 Id. at 539. 
273 Title II of the ADA prohibits any public entity from discriminating against “qualified” persons with 
disabilities in the provision or operation of public services, programs or activities.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-
12165.   
274 Lane, 541 U.S. at 523.  Unquestionably, this cautious choice of the operative right was done to retain 
the vote of Justice O’Connor, who invalidated the legislation in Garrett, Florida Prepaid, Morrison, and 
Kimel.  See Araiza, supra note 247, at 47. 
REMEDIAL PROPORTIONALITY 
 37
courthouse.275  The majority placed these specific constitutional violations into context 
by setting them “against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment” in the 
administration of public services and programs including marriage, voting, and juror 
service.276   This expansive scope of harm against the disabled, according to the 
majority, balanced the broad scope of the remedy enacted by Congress prohibiting the 
exclusion or denial of benefits to a disabled person in the provision of any public 
services and programs.277  Moreover, the majority emphasized the particularly tailored 
and limited scope of the ADA remedial legislation.278  Congress required only that 
“reasonable accommodations” be made for the disabled, and did not require a public 
entity to do everything possible.279  The narrow scope of the enacted remedy coupled 
with the broad scope of the identified harm established the proportional balance needed 
to uphold the legislation.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist was incensed by the inartful application of the 
proportionality standard.280  “While the Court today pays lipservice to the ‘congruence 
and proportionality’ test, it applies it in a manner inconsistent with our recent 
precedent.”281  He faulted the majority for attempting to “rig the congruence-and-
proportionality test by artificially constricting the scope of the statute to closely mirror a 
recognized constitutional right.”282  He criticized the majority for selecting the 
fundamental right of access to the courts as the operative right, but relying upon 
evidence of widespread discrimination against the disabled in non-court settings like 
marriage, voting, and public education to justify the law.283  Rehnquist found “nothing 
in the legislative record or statutory findings to indicate that disabled persons were 
systematically denied” the right of access to the courts.284  Given the “near-total lack of 
actual constitutional violations in the congressional record,” the dissenters would have 
invalidated the remedial legislation as in Garrett.285   Rehnquist also criticized Congress 
for the “massive overbreadth” of the remedial legislation that covered a panoply of 
rights, including access to amusement parks and hockey games, extending far beyond 
the scope of the plaintiffs’ rights to court.286    
 Commentators have generally attacked the Court’s application of proportionality 
in the Section 5 cases as nothing more than conservative politics.287  It is true that three 
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Justices (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) have consistently voted to invalidate 
legislation.  And two others (Justices Souter and Breyer) have consistently voted to 
affirm legislation.  However, four Justices (Stevens, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and 
Ginsburg) have switched sides during these cases.  Professor William Arazia explained 
the difference in the recent cases as of one of “mood,” finding that “while Lane's actual 
review of the evidence is not marked by any self-conscious alteration of pre-existing 
law, that review surely reveals a more lenient mood than does the analogous review in 
Garrett and previous cases. . . .”288   The Court, however, has explained the variation as 
nothing more than the proper operation of the proportionality rule, which serves to 
ferret out inappropriate remedies while upholding those which are properly tailored.  
 
 D.  The Exception to the Rule: Justice Scalia Rejects Proportionality 
 
 Justice Scalia stands as the one Justice who expressly rejects remedial 
proportionality.  In all civil remedial contexts (save injunctions), Scalia has refused to 
apply the proportionality standard.  Citing the inherent subjectivity of proportionality, 
he has disavowed it as “insusceptible of principled application.”289   
 In the punitive damages cases, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, 
criticized the use of remedial proportionality, arguing that it is “constrained by no 
principle other than the Justices' subjective assessment of the ‘reasonableness’ of the 
award in relation to the conduct for which it was assessed.”290  Elaborating on the 
subjectivity, Scalia attacked the Court’s use of proportionality analysis, claiming it 
reflected “a judgment about the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage, which is 
hardly an analytical determination.”291  
 
In truth, the “guideposts” mark a road to nowhere; they provide no real 
guidance at all. . . . One expects the Court to conclude: “To thine own 
self be true.”  These crisscrossing platitudes yield no real answers in no 
real cases.  . . . The Court has constructed a framework that does not 
genuinely constrain, that does not inform state legislatures and lower 
courts—that does nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal 
analysis upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular 
award of punitive damages was not “fair.”292 
 
The claims against proportionality for punitive damages proffered by Scalia and 
Thomas are bound up in their position that the Constitution does not protect against 
excessive amounts of awards.293  Rather than federal review of state awards, the 
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dissenting Justices would defer to the jury as to the proper measure of relief, subject to 
weak judicial review by state courts for reasonableness.294   
 Similarly, in Hibbs and Lane Justice Scalia rejected the remedial proportionality 
standard, despite his acknowledged adherence to the rule in the previous litany of 
Section 5 cases.295  Scalia thus found himself dissenting from the Court’s decision 
upholding legislative remedial programs.  This result is ironic given Scalia’s 
jurisprudential belief in deference to the legislative branches, and in Congress as the 
most democratic of the three governmental branches.296   In Lane, Scalia reasserted 
those deferential proclivities on a larger scale, rejecting the proportionality review 
altogether in the Section 5 context.297 
 
I yield to the lessons of experience.  The “congruence and 
proportionality” standard, like all such flabby tests, is a standing 
invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.  
Worse still, it casts this Court in the role of Congress’s taskmaster.  
Under it, the courts (and ultimately this Court) must regularly check 
Congress’s homework to make sure that it has identified sufficient 
constitutional violations to make its remedy congruent and proportional.  
As a general matter, we are ill advised to adopt or adhere to 
constitutional rules that bring us into constant conflict with a coequal 
branch of Government.298   
 
  Such engagement with Congress was exacerbated, Scalia said, by the use of a 
test that “cannot be shown to have been met or failed.”299  Thus, his rejection of 
proportionality was driven in part by its inherent subjectivity.  As Scalia explained, “I 
have generally rejected tests based on such malleable standards as ‘proportionality,’ 
because they have a way of turning into vehicles for the implementation of individual 
judges’ policy preferences.”300   
 This disavowal parallels Justice Scalia’s rejection of proportionality in the 
criminal context.  He has rejected proportionality review of criminal sentences 
altogether, finding the oversight of criminal punishments to be inherently subjective and 
incapable of intelligent application.301   While Scalia is thus consistent in his rejection 
of proportionality, the Court is not.  Many commentators have addressed the 
inconsistencies between the Court’s escalation of proportionality review for civil 
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remedies and its rejection of the strict standard for criminal sanctions.302  The Court’s 
experience with the strict proportionality standard over several decades in the criminal 
context led it to conclude that such a standard was too malleable to provide sufficient 
meaning and guidance.303  Instead, the majority of the Court adopted a weak 
proportionality standard for reviewing punishments in non-capital cases.304  This weak 
standard of “gross disproportionality” examines sentences only to see if they are 
extreme, rather than carefully calibrated, and reversal is reserved for the rare case.305  
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, explained,  “The 
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between the crime and 
sentence.  Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to 
the crime.”306  Applying the gross disproportionality standard, the Court has upheld 
sentences of 25 years to life for recidivists stealing three golf clubs307 or $150 in 
videos.308   
Similarly, in the excessive fines case of United States v. Bajakajian, Justice 
Thomas explained that the principle of proportionality in criminal law requires that “the 
amount of forfeiture bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is 
designed to punish.”309  He acknowledged that “just how proportional to a criminal 
offense a fine must be will be inherently imprecise.”310  This imprecision, he explained, 
justified the adoption of a gross disproportionality standard, rather than a strict standard 
mandating precise proportionality of a sentence.311  Under this standard, the defendant’s 
fine of $357,144, the full amount of the cash he failed to declare when leaving the 
country, was held to be grossly disproportionate to the statutory fine of $5,000.312  Thus, 
Justice Thomas seems to accept some level of proportionality review for criminal 
sanctions despite his rejection of such a rule for punitive damages. 
Despite its experience with the difficulties of proportionality analysis in the 
criminal context, the Court continues to embrace proportionality review of civil 
                                                 
302 Ristroph, supra note 47, at 267; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1049 (2004); Karlan, supra note 110, at 880; Frase, supra note 42; Rachel A. Van Cleave, Death is 
Different, is Money? Criminal v. Punitives and Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 217 (2003); 
Adam Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court’s Backwards Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing 
Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1249 (2000). 
303 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
304 Id. at 72; Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20 (O’Connor, J., plurality). 
305 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73.   
306 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (upholding in a 5-4 decision a first-time offender’s sentence of life in 
prison for possession of 672 grams of cocaine). 
307 Ewing, 538 at 25-28. 
308 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 64.  In fact, in only one modern case has the Court struck down a prison sentence 
as disproportionate.  See Solem v. Helms, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (Powell, J.) (striking down sentence of life 
in prison for petty criminal with six prior minor felonies for writing bad check for $100); see also Weems 
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (invalidating Philippine penalty in part for its disproportionality). 
309 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). While Justice Thomas endorsed the proportionality standard for excessive 
fines in Bajakajian, he rejected all proportionality review for criminal sentences in joining Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Ewing.  538 U.S. at 32. 
310 Id. at 335-36. 
311 Id. at 336-37. 
312 Id. at 339. 
REMEDIAL PROPORTIONALITY 
 41
remedies. Indeed, the Court, other than Justice Scalia and perhaps Justice Thomas, 
appears willing to rely increasingly on proportionality in the context of remedies.  
Exploring the Court’s motivations for the proportionality principle in remedies, it 
appears that the Court is determined to continue on its current course.   
   
III. JUSTIFYING  PROPORTIONAL REMEDIES  
 
 The Supreme Court has not expressly articulated the reasons why it has 
embraced proportionality as the judicial standard for assessing whether relief is 
appropriate.  Yet woven through its decisions are clues as to the motivations guiding the 
Justices in their near-universal adoption of proportionality for remedies.  Implicit in the 
decisions are concerns about structural and legal integrity that seem to be motivating the 
Court.  Three justifications emerge from reading between the lines of these cases: the 
need for objectivity in decisionmaking; the belief in judicial restraint and minimalism; 
and the curtailment of excessive litigation and remedies.  All three of these justifications 
lead to limiting the exercise of the remedial power, whether that relief stems from the 
lower courts, juries, or Congress.   
  These three implicit justifications for the proportionality rule mirror the core 
concerns embodied in the international norm of proportionality:  rationality, restraint, 
and reciprocity.313  These “three Rs” define the core of proportionality analysis and 
provide guidance in evaluating governmental action.314  When considering the 
rationality of a governmental action, international courts first evaluate whether the 
action is appropriate, arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations.315  
International courts then ask whether the governmental response is restrained, taking 
into account the availability of less restrictive alternatives.316  Finally, international 
courts look for reciprocity, or proper fit between the harm and the judicial measure.317  
Together, these three Rs create a rule of minimal governmental action.   
 These same three global principles are reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
own homegrown version of remedial proportionality.  The three Rs provide an 
organizational framework for understanding the Court’s justifications for remedial 
proportionality.  The principle of rationality is embodied in the Court’s emphasis on an 
objective, logical standard to constrain biased decisionmaking.  The principle of 
restraint is seen in the Court’s embrace of judicial minimalism and preference for the 
least-restrictive remedy.  And the principle of reciprocity is evident in the Court’s 
concerns with defendants being asked to respond to a wrong with a remedy in excess of 
the amount of harm caused.   
 There is, however, one crucial distinction between the international norm of 
proportionality and the U.S. Supreme Court’s remedial proportionality rule.  While the 
rest of the world uses proportionality to protect plaintiffs, the Supreme Court uses 
proportionality to insulate defendants.  On the international level, the norm of 
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proportionality is generally used to protect plaintiffs against governmental intrusion.318  
Proportionality is used as a mechanism of judicial review to prevent exercises of 
excessive legislative and executive power that infringe on individual rights.319  
Conversely, the remedial proportionality principle of the Supreme Court is used to 
curtail excessive judicial intrusions into the interests of government and corporate 
defendants.320  Both approaches share a theory of limited government, but the American 
approach applies this theory to benefit only defendants.  It encourages, rather than 
prevents, the trumping of governmental interests to outweigh individual rights, thus 
turning the principle of individual freedom on its head.      
 This section seeks to flesh out the reasons why an Americanized remedial 
proportionality principle has emerged.  Viewing the cases from the Court’s perspective, 
this section lays out the justifications given by the Court for its adoption of a rule of 
proportional relief. 
 
 A.  Rationality: The Pursuit of Objectivity 
   
The Court believes that the proportionality standard in remedies provides an 
objective judicial measurement that ensures the rationality of judicial decisions.  
Rationality seeks a logical basis for legal reasoning that is not based on arbitrary, unfair, 
or biased grounds.  In the punitive damages cases, for example, the Court has been 
concerned with punitives based on jury bias rather than “objective” measures.321  The 
proportionality standard injects an objective standard into the judicial decisionmaking 
process providing a logical basis for remedial decisions. The Court, perhaps like many 
lay people, assumes that judicial discretion is potentially unbounded.  As the old legal 
maxim states, “equity is as long as a chancellor’s foot,” meaning that what is “fair” 
varies randomly from judge to judge.322   
  This search for objectivity was the crux of the judicial debate in TXO, in which 
the Court first began to consider a proportionality standard for punitive damages.323  
The perceived need for an objective standard to avoid caprice and bias in 
decisionmaking was the guiding principle that steered the Court towards the eventual 
adoption of remedial proportionality rule.  The Justices and the parties recognized the 
importance of an objective standard; they simply disagreed as whether the standard was 
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quantitative, qualitative, or both.324  Justice O’Connor explained the need for objective 
rules of decision to avoid “arbitrariness, caprice, passion, bias, and even malice [that] 
can replace reasoned judgment and law as the basis for jury decisionmaking.”325 She 
then pushed the Court to develop specific objective factors to further refine that 
decisionmaking:   
 
As an initial matter, constitutional judgments should not be, or appear to 
be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices.  Without objective 
criteria on which to rely, almost any decision regarding proportionality 
will be a matter of personal preference.   One judge's excess very well 
may be another's moderation.   To avoid that element of subjectivity, our 
judgments should be informed by objective factors to the maximum 
possible extent.326 
 
 The Court thus developed objective factors to further direct the exercise of 
proportionality review.  The Court enunciated several three-part tests to approach the 
proportionality decision in a logical fashion.  For injunctions, the proportionality review 
must measure the scope of the harm, match the scope of relief, and account for the 
interests of state defendants.327  For punitive damages, the Court must evaluate the 
“three guideposts” of the reprehensibility of the conduct, the amount of compensatory 
damages, and the availability of other sanctions.328  And for Section 5 remedies, the 
Court must identify the contours of the constitutional right at issue, identify the 
evidence in support of a history of demonstrated harms, and evaluate the proper scope 
of a congruent and proportional remedy.329  In each case, the Court is simply 
elaborating on the basic balancing concept of matching the scope of the remedy to the 
scope of the harm.  The establishment of additional objective factors aims to define the 
proportionality standard and standardize the judicial decisionmaking. 
  Proportionality thus purports to provide the transparency of reason to counter 
the notions of subjective remedial discretion.330  As Justice Roberts expressed in his 
concurrence in eBay, “discretion is not whim.  It is based on legal principles that are 
needed to establish consistency across the cases.”331  The legal principle of 
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proportionality provides transparency by calling for rational explanations to appear in 
judicial decisions, thus providing added legitimacy to the rule of law.  Application of 
the standard and its attendant factors allows us to view the operation of justice as a 
mechanical operation, and thus counters the criticism of judicial discretion as personal 
whim.  It is the rule’s transparency that helps to maintain the credibility of the rule of 
law by militating against claims of bias. 
  Finally, the assumed objectivity of the proportionality standard is designed to 
provide consistency across the judicial system.  This perceived consistency provides the 
model of a level playfield in the law.  For example, proportionality provides a consistent 
standard in punitive damages that the Court says provides adequate notice to defendants 
of potential penalties.332  The use of formulas, ratios, and three-factored tests provides 
the appearance of objectivity necessary to avoid the caprice of the decisionmaker.  
Thus, the proportionality rule emerged in part as an antidote to biased decisionmaking.  
Its principle of balanced justice satisfied the demand for rationality in judicial 
decisionmaking to preserve the rule of law.   
  
B. Restraint: A Rule of Judicial Minimalism 
 
 The Court has also justified its remedial proportionality test in the injunctions 
context as a rule of judicial restraint.  The Court has articulated rules requiring the least 
restrictive remedy motivated by proper deference to the legislative and executive 
branches.  This results in an overarching preference for modest, narrowly tailored 
remedies that provide relief to plaintiff at the least cost or burden to the defendant.333    
 An example of the Court’s motivation of remedial judicial restraint can be seen 
in Ayotte, where the Court refused to uphold a broad injunction striking down a New 
Hampshire abortion law for minors that impermissibly failed to include an exception for 
the preservation of the minor’s health.334  The Court criticized the courts below for 
choosing the “most blunt remedy” rather than more narrowly tailored relief.335  In 
vacating the overbroad remedy, the Court announced a general preference for the least 
restrictive remedy, mindful of its own limited institutional competence.336  The Court 
noted concerns with crafting more comprehensive remedies because such “line-drawing 
is inherently complex” and risks “serious invasion of the legislative domain.”337  The 
Ayotte Court thus embraced the remedial rule of proportionality and the preference for 
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“modest” remedies based on deference to the legislature and notions of judicial 
incompetence.338  
 The Court’s reasoning evidences a theory of judicial passivity or minimalism.339 
Justice O’Connor, the author of the unanimous Ayotte opinion, was the leading 
minimalist on the Supreme Court.340  The minimalist approach seeks to “reduce the role 
of judicial lawmaking” and advance the theme that the Court’s power and that of the 
federal courts is sharply limited.341  Under this guise, courts are incompetent to craft 
remedies for ordinary litigants and must act cautiously, mindful of this disability.342  
The proportionality principle’s rule of remedial restraint advances this theory of limited 
judicial competence.  Whether the cases are rationalized by federalist notions of respect 
for the states or deference to the legislature,343 the result is that the courts are 
encouraged to be more restrained in remedying violations of the law.   
 The irony is that this belief in the Court’s limited competence and deferential 
treatment of the legislature does not emerge as a rationale for the use of remedial 
proportionality in the cases of punitive damages or Section 5 remedies.  In contrast, the 
Court in these contexts distrusts the legislature, whether Congressional enactments of 
new protections or the state legislatures’ failure to enact tort reform.344 
The reconciling factor is a broader belief in remedial minimalism and a hostility 
to litigation as means of providing social justice. 345  As Professor Siegel has suggested, 
the Court appears hostile to litigation and its remedial rewards as the way of resolving 
social issues, and thus the Rehnquist Court’s cases have “directly and consistently 
moved to limit both access to and the remedial power of the federal courts.”346  For 
example, in Campbell, the Court noted that “a more modest punishment for this 
reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the State’s legitimate objectives, and the 
Utah courts should have gone no further.”347  Thus, as Siegel concludes, the 
“contentious struggles over remedial issues that litter the Rehnquist Court’s case reports 
are not battles over whether the Court should cut back on judicial discretion, equitable 
remedies, or litigation-positive interpretive strategies but instead disputes over how far 
                                                 
338 Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. at 969. 
339 Judicial minimalists favor rulings that are narrow and shallow that “produce outcomes and rationales 
on which diverse people can agree, not withstanding their disagreements on fundamental issues.” Cass R. 
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such a trend should go.”348  Remedial minimalism explains the Court’s preference for 
modest judicial relief. 
 
 C. Reciprocity: Curbing Remedial Excess 
 
 The third motivation for proportionality found in the remedies cases is the need 
for reciprocity between remedy and harm in order to curb remedial excess.  The Court 
perceives remedial excess in injunctions that micromanage public institutions, punitives 
that bankrupt companies, and windfall recoveries that make attorneys millionaires.  
Public schools are ordered to build planetariums, and wealthy doctors win millions 
when their Beemers are repainted.349  The overreaching in many cases has triggered a 
rebound effect in which the Court has reacted by crafting a rule of proportionality to 
block the excess.  Such excess cannot be seen as reciprocal or corresponding to the 
proven harm when it fails to match the scope or gravity of the violation.  Reciprocity in 
which the remedy provides an equivalent counterpart to the harm restores a sense of 
balance to the judicial arena at a time when excess appears to run rampant. 
 The first premise behind the reciprocity rationale is the Court’s strong antipathy 
toward remedial windfalls.  The punitive damages cases are replete with exclamations 
denouncing the outrageous rise of the remedy.  Punitives are “skyrocketing,” awards are 
“monstrous,” and the system has “run wild.” 350   The Court is reacting to a perceived 
problem of remedial excess, despite recent scholarship denying the problem.351  As 
Professor Siegel aptly described, the Court believes that “the American system of 
compensation for private injuries is desperately out of control, producing untold riches 
for plaintiffs’ lawyers and mammoth rewards for a handful of lucky litigants, warping 
the incentive structures for businesses and professionals, and causing a concomitant loss 
of efficiency and societal wealth.”352   
 Underlying the reciprocity rationale is a distrust of society’s factfinders.  The 
Court distrusts the juries, judges, and legislatures, believing that left to their own 
druthers, these decisionmakers will overreach to the extent possible.  This distrust is 
evident in the punitive damages context, where some Justices have expressed fears that 
uninformed juries biased against big business will engage in random social 
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349 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 78; Gore, 517 U.S. at 567  
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redistribution.353  In public law injunction cases, the distrust is directed against activist 
judges who allegedly act to advance their own liberal theories of social justice.354  And 
in the Section 5 context, the Court suspects that the legislature will take every 
opportunity to exceed the boundaries of Section 5 and legislate broadly for the general 
welfare, contrary to judicial interpretations of the Constitution.355   
 Armed with this distrust, the reciprocal commands of proportionality impose 
limits to restore the balance of justice.  Proportionality works as a limitation on the 
remedy, requiring an equivalent societal response to wrong.  This reciprocity, like the 
Moseaic “an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth,” demands parallel response and nothing 
more.356  The command of an eye for an eye was originally instituted as a limitation to 
restrain people from over-punishing wrongs.357  The people’s inclination in Biblical 
times, perhaps as now, was to respond to wrongdoing with retribution and vengeance.358  
The Old Testament command was meant to restrict this impulse by instilling remedial 
power solely in magistrates, and requiring them to craft proportional responses.359   
 The use of a proportionality standard to restrict the inappropriate excess of 
response to wrongdoing thus explains the Supreme Court’s motivation in its modern 
remedial proportionality cases.  It views the world as one in which remedies have 
crossed over to vengeance due to the overreaching of judges into policymaking and 
remedial excess.  Defendants receive vengeance, rather than appropriate sanctions, by a 
system run amuck with overly harsh remedies.  The doctrinal rule of proportionality is 
meant to restrict this retributive judicial policymaking and misuse of discretion, limiting 
judicial remedies to more appropriate, “civilized” responses.  
 
IV. THE MYTH OF PROPORTIONALITY AND ITS ATTENDANT 
DANGERS    
 
The application of the proportionality principle, however belies the myth 
of neutrality.  Indeed, any utilization of the principle beyond the theoretical 
necessarily implicates the very use of judicial discretion and subjectivity the rule 
seeks to avoid.  Beyond the misconception of proportionality as an inherently 
evenhanded standard lies the risk of danger from buying in too strongly to this 
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rule.  Proportionality as currently applied by the Supreme Court in its strict 
remedial form risks the adoption of a rule of Supreme Court judicial supremacy 
that elevates the preferences of defendant wrongdoers above justice to plaintiffs.  
This perversion of the remedial process into protection for the wrongdoer is a 
threat to the rule of law that must be addressed. 
 
 A. The Mask of Objectivity 
 
 The lure of objective remedial proportionality is a mirage.  The establishment of 
a doctrinal rule and the identification of component objective factors does not save the 
standard from subjectivity.  Rather, as some Justices and commentators have noted, 
proportionality remains an inherently subjective standard.360   Professor Karlan put it 
succinctly:  “proportionality is both an inherently alluring and an inevitably 
unsatisfactory measure of constitutionality . . . . The problem lies in translating the 
principle into a standard for judicial oversight.  For all the Court’s invocation of 
objective factors, it turns out that a key aspect of proportionality review remains 
fundamentally subjective.”361  This inherent subjectivity is compounded when its 
transparency is shrouded by a rule that seems to require precise, objective measurement.   
 Subjectivity is inherent in the proportionality analysis, from the initial framing 
of the question to the selection and evaluation of qualitative factors.   Justice Kennedy 
made this point in arguing against the adoption of a proportionality standard for 
punitive damages in TXO (though he later signed on to the proportionality standard in 
BMW and State Farm):   
 
To ask whether a particular award of punitive damages is grossly 
excessive begs the question:  excessive in relation to what?   The answer 
excessive in relation to the conduct of the tortfeasor may be correct, but 
it is unhelpful, for we are still bereft of any standard by which to 
compare the punishment to the malefaction that gave rise to it.   A 
reviewing court employing this formulation comes close to relying upon 
nothing more than its own subjective reaction to a particular punitive 
damages award in deciding whether the award violates the Constitution.   
This type of review, far from imposing meaningful, law-like restraints on 
jury excess, could become as fickle as the process it is designed to 
superintend.   Furthermore, it might give the illusion of judicial certainty 
where none in fact exists . . . .362 
 
                                                 
360 See, e.g., See Gore, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he application of the Court’s new rule 
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J., dissenting); TXO, 509 U.S. at 466-70 (Kennedy, J. concurring); Karlan, supra note 101, at 882.  
361 See Karlan, supra note 101, at 882-83. 
362 TXO, 509 U.S. at 466-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Despite these strong reservations, Kennedy 
eventually signed on to the objective proportionality standard in Gore, 517 U.S. at 559, and wrote the 
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 The objectivity of the proportionality principle is skewed from the start by the 
way in which the Court frames the question.  The Court must ask whether the remedy is 
proportional, but proportional to what?  The ability to alter the comparison point 
demonstrates the manipulability of the proportionality rule.  It is this manipulability in 
the framing of the proportionality question that renders the standard subjective.  For 
example, in the punitive damages context, the Court can frame the proportionality 
comparison as punitives compared to compensatories,363 to actual harm,364 to potential 
harm,365 or to reprehensibility of the conduct.366  As Justice Ginsburg noted, the result 
as to the validity of punitive measures varies depending on the reframing of the 
question: “By switching the focus from the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages 
to the potential loss to the plaintiffs had the defendant succeeded in its illicit scheme, 
the Court could describe the relevant ratio in TXO as 10 to 1” rather than the 526 to 1 
achieved by comparing punitives to actual harm.367     
 The framing problem was at the heart of the debate over a punitive damages 
award in the recently decided Philip Morris v. Williams.368  The Oregon Supreme Court 
awarded punitive damages of $79.5 million against Philip Morris, an amount 97 times 
greater than the compensatory damages awarded, because of the company’s extreme 
reprehensibility in defrauding consumers as to the dangers of tobacco smoking.369  
Philip Morris argued in its briefs to the Supreme Court that damages should be 
measured solely by the mathematical ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, as 
highlighted in Campbell.370  Mrs. Williams, the widow of a man who died of lung 
cancer caused by smoking, framed the proportionality issue differently; she argued that 
the proportionality of the punitive award must be balanced against both the quantitative 
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages and the qualitative factor of the 
tobacco company’s reprehensibility.371  Thus, the proper amount of punitive damages 
could have turned simply on how the proportionality question was framed, dictating the 
components compared and the qualitative or quantitative nature of the inquiry.  The 
framing of the question alone would have dictated the result—a straightforward 
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quantitative computation would have easily concluded that the $79.5 million award was 
excessive.  The Supreme Court, however, avoided the proportionality question 
altogether, remanding the case on an alternative ground due to the jury’s improper 
consideration of the defendant’s conduct towards third parties in the punitive damages 
calculus.372 
 The framing problem is apparent in other instances of remedial proportionality.  
In the context of attorney fees, fees can be balanced against the amount of damages, the 
total relief, or the “public benefit” obtained.  This was the issue in City of Riverside v. 
Rivera, where the defendants argued for a strict proportionality of the fees awarded 
($300,000) to damages obtained ($32,000) to invalidate the award.373  The Court 
entertained a comparison of fees to total relief granted ($32,000 and no injunction), but 
ultimately upheld the award by framing the question as fees compared to the “public 
benefit” obtained in the exposure of discriminatory police misconduct.374  
 In the desegregation cases, the validity of the school decrees varies by the 
framing of the initial question of proportionality.  At times, the desegregation cases 
have allowed remedies to address de facto segregation, while at other times it has not.  
When the question has been framed to include economic and housing segregation as 
part of the “harm” through a series of causal links and presumptions, the remedy for de 
facto segregation as been upheld.375  When the “harm” is isolated to include only the 
school’s affirmative acts of segregation, then the approved remedy has been 
narrowed.376  In Jenkins, the lower court tried to frame the scope of the harm to include 
white flight, arguing it was causally linked to the segregation because when segregation 
was prohibited, white residents fled to the suburbs.377  Accordingly, a valid remedy 
could address that consequence by creating high quality magnet schools to attract 
students back from suburbs.  A five-Justice majority of the Court rejected this depiction, 
and reframed the question to circumscribe the relevant harm to include only the initial 
segregation of school assignments.378   
 Subjectivity thus drives the framing question as the courts decide what will be 
placed upon the scale to balance against the remedy.  Because proportionality is an 
ends-means test, “how broadly or how narrowly the Court conceptualizes the proper 
unit of analysis will matter in every” case.379  The subjective manipulation inherent in 
the definition of the problem explains the widely disparate results in Lane and Garrett 
as to the constitutionality of legislative remedies under separate titles of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.   In Lane, the plaintiffs’ specific right at issue – that of access to 
the courts – was placed within the broader context of disability discrimination in society 
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to conceptualize a broad problem justifying broad legislative remedies.380  Garrett in 
contrast, evaluated only the particular violation suffered by the plaintiff, employment 
discrimination by the state, and expressly excluded from consideration the generalized 
context of disability discrimination.381  Both Lane and Garrett were 5-4 decisions, but 
with the switch of Justice O’Connor, the remedial disability legislation was upheld 
when conceptualizing the problem as one of broad, societal harm. 
 In this way, the framing question undermines the alleged neutrality of the 
remedial proportionality standard by significantly altering the question that must be 
answered.   Once the question is framed, the remedial question of matching 
proportionality is relatively easy to answer.  The answer to the proportionality analysis 
simply depends upon the question asked, and that question varies depending upon the 
eye of the beholder.  Therefore, the proportionality standard masks underlying judicial 
subjectivity by feigning objectivity and neutrality.  It subverts the normative questions 
by making remedial decisions seem mechanical, objective, and straightforward when 
they are not. 
 Add to this framing discretion a secondary level of subjectivity which enters 
judicial decisions by the selection of the analytical inputs for the proportionality 
calculus.   Subjectivity enters into the decisionmaking as the judges select the 
appropriate inputs for consideration – for example evaluating the magnitude of the harm 
or the reprehensibility of the conduct.  In the punitive damages context, what is 
“reprehensible”? 382  The seriousness of a harm is not a universal, timeless fact, but 
rather turns upon the views of the individual judges.383  Though “dressed up as a legal 
opinion, it is really no more than a disagreement with the community’s sense of 
indignation or outrage expressed in the punitive award of the . . . jury.”384  As Justice 
Scalia argued in BMW, judicial review “reflects not merely a judgment about a matter 
of degree, but a judgment about the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage, which 
is hardly an analytical determination. . . .  There is no precedential warrant for giving 
our judgment priority over the judgment of state courts and juries on this matter.”385  
Thus, as Professor Spencer put it, the “objective” guideposts of proportionality are just 
as subjective as the “Takes-the-Judicial-Breath-Away-and-Raises-the-Judicial-
Eyebrows Test:  all involve the Supreme Court in making its own determinations on 
behalf of an entire nation.”386  
  
B.  Dangerous Deference to the Defendants 
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 Remedial proportionality as currently utilized by the Supreme Court is a 
defendant-friendly concept.  The Court has co-opted the international norm of 
proportionality as protection for victims and used it as a sword to cut down plaintiffs’ 
rights.  It has perverted the international norm by fashioning a rule of protection of 
“fundamental rights” for corporate defendants, institutional actors, and states.387   
This pro-defendant bias has been well-documented in a series of articles by 
Professor Wendy Parker examining injunctive relief in discrimination cases.388  In 
tracing the Court’s desegregation cases and the resulting doctrinal rules of injunctive 
proportionality, Parker has seen a shocking rule of deference to defendants at the 
plaintiffs’ expense.389  She concludes:  “The Supreme Court's approach to school 
desegregation in particular and public law remedies in general has prevented lower 
court judges from undertaking principled, well-grounded remedial processes and has 
ceded too much remedial power to the defendants, the alleged or adjudicated 
wrongdoer.”390  Similarly, the cases on punitive damages demonstrate a primary 
concern with the welfare of the defendant.391  And even the Section 5 cases align with 
the defendant states over the individual victims or the people’s protectors in 
Congress.392  
 The Supreme Court’s pro-defendant remedial bias is dangerous in two respects.  
First, it fails to create the incentives necessary to alter illegal behavior.  If defendants 
control the remedies, and courts must abide by the defendants’ interests in crafting 
remedies, then there is less incentive to change illegal behavior.  Justice O’Connor 
recognized this pitfall in Ayotte where she acknowledged the potential invitation to state 
legislatures to carelessly legislate and leave it to the courts to sort out.  Similarly, in the 
punitive damages context, the remedial proportionality rule encourages careless 
behavior by potential wrongdoers.393  A proportionality rule in which defendants 
receive relatively insubstantial penalties is “simply [] a tolerable cost of a certain course 
of action, provided the ultimate benefits to be gained outweigh that cost.”394  Thus, it 
will likely “influence the tortfeasor’s rational-cost minimizing choice with respect to the 
utilization of reasonable and/or reprehensible input activities.  If the price of 
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reprehensible input activities decreases relative to the price of reasonable input 
activities, then one can anticipate an increase in such reprehensible activities.”395 
 Second, the pro-defendant remedial bias skews the supposed balance of rights 
inherent in proportionality by prioritizing defendants’ rights at the expense of 
plaintiffs.396  Missing from these cases is any concern for when plaintiffs are accorded 
too little relief.397  The Supreme Court does not strictly review motions for additur of 
punitive damages or enhance punitive damage awards to address the fact that a pay-
your-own attorney fee system leaves the injured plaintiff less than fully compensated.  
In other words, proportionality is not a two-way street.  The Court appears unconcerned 
with disproportionality that harms plaintiffs.    
 There is therefore a significant cost associated with this pro-defendant rule: the 
very real risk of under-enforcement of the law.398  The result may have some appeal to 
Justices who believe that the legal system has run amok and that certain remedies, like 
structural injunctions and punitive damages, should not in fact be enforced.   But the 
real cost is to plaintiffs and to the legal system.  Plaintiffs have the burden of initiating 
lawsuits, and incentives to do so have been lessened.  As between the two parties in the 
lawsuit, where remedial measures are at issue, the plaintiff is the one who has suffered 
harm, and the defendant the wrongdoer.  Tipping the balance in favor of the defendant 
signals that plaintiffs, and the laws that protect them, are not important.  
 
 C. Unveiling Proportionality as Judicial Activism 
 
 By now it should be apparent that the remedial proportionality principle is not a 
rule of minimalism, but rather a rule of judicial activism.  The Supreme Court is not 
taking the path of least resistance in these cases, but instead is actively engaged in 
policymaking to displace the traditional remedial process.  The evidence speaks for 
itself.  The quest for a rule of objectivity has in fact widened the doors for subjectivity.  
Claims of minimalism and modesty have produced activism.  And the cry for restraint 
has resulted in the active overturning of carefully crafted remedies.  
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 This article’s revelation of the operation of remedial proportionality in the 
Supreme Court cases supports the conclusion of others that this is one of the most 
activist Courts in history.399  Remedial proportionality establishes a rule of judicial 
supremacy in which the Court strikes down remedies with which it disagrees and enacts 
remedial reform that could not pass the legislative branches.400  Proportionality becomes 
the doctrinal mechanism by which the Supreme Court activates its judicial supremacy.  
Ironically, while proportionality was intended as a rule to curb the alleged judicial 
activism of the lower court exercising broad remedial power and issuing broad rulings, 
proportionality has now transferred that activist potential to the highest court in the 
land. 401   
 At some level, the term “judicial activism” is merely an epithet that can be 
hurled at any court decision with which the accuser disagrees.402  Justice Ginsburg 
stated during her confirmation hearings that judicial activism is "a label too often 
pressed into service by critics of court results rather than the legitimacy of court 
decisions."403  Conservatives have used the term to attack public law injunctions in 
schools and prisons, while liberals have used the epithet to attack judicial invalidations 
of social legislation.404  However, the judicial activism of proportionality analysis is 
more than a simple disagreement over the content of the result.405  The activism results 
from the displacement of the usual, centuries-old process of remedial judicial 
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decisionmaking by a new higher Court supremacy.  Such displacement of long-accepted 
judicial process of crafting remedies is the essence of judicial activism.406  
 As demonstrated, proportionality analysis does not produce a rational, restrained 
rule of judicial remedies.  Instead, it replaces the normal remedial functioning of the 
judicial process with a subjective rule of Supreme Court supremacy that gives the Court 
the singular power to determine remedies. 
 
V. CONCLUSION: RESTORING DEFERENTIAL REVIEW OF 
REMEDIES  
 
The open question is whether this trend toward heightened scrutiny of remedial 
decisions through the use of a proportionality standard will continue.  Virtually every 
member of the Court has advanced the cause of proportionality in one context or 
another.  The acceptance of the proportionality standard seems to cut across 
jurisprudential lines and political sides, making it likely that such a standard will 
survive in the near future.407  Yet, Justice O’Connor was a driving force in many of the 
key remedial cases of the modern Court, and her absence may portend a change in the 
remedial winds.  It may also be that Justice Scalia’s rejection of proportionality in both 
the civil and criminal contexts will garner additional support from the newest members 
of the Court.  
Armed with a more transparent understanding of remedial proportionality and its 
false promises, legal scholars and jurists can begin to shake the belief in proportionality 
as an absolute measure of objectivity.  The focus of this article has been to debunk the 
assumed validity of proportionality by deconstructing the rule and its strict application 
by the Court.  It does not conclude, however, without offering a recommendation for the 
future.  For as Elisabeth Zoller argues, the proportionality test “is a legal tool that is 
neutral in itself. . . . it can be good or evil, depending on the use that is made of it. . . . 
The problem is to learn how to use it.”408 
The courts need to retain the ability to check for excessive remedies through the 
process of deferential judicial review.  Justice Scalia’s rejection of all remedial 
oversight risks would prevent the Court from being able to capture remedial outliers 
that deserve the Court’s disfavor, such as public school planetariums or $175 million 
awards for emotional distress unaccompanied by personal injury.  If reviewing courts 
stop asking what remedy is “just right,” and instead look only for remedies that are 
“grossly excessive,” the range of consensus is likely to increase as to what is in fact too 
extreme.  While the range of appropriate relief on the remedial spectrum is vast, the 
spectrum’s extremes are more clear.  Judgments about the relative excessiveness of 
remedies are far more consistent than determinations of the absolute measure of precise 
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remedial response.409  The relative consensus dilutes the impact of the inherent 
subjectivity of the standard by addressing the extremes upon which most reasonable 
people can agree, rather than turning on the personal views of a few individual judges.    
Rejecting strict proportionality in favor of deferential judicial review is the 
doctrinal path taken by the Supreme Court in the criminal proportionality cases.  After 
several decades of experience with a strict proportionality standard in the criminal 
sentencing context, a majority of the Court has rejected it as unworkable and amenable 
to judicial subjectivity.410  Instead, the Court has adopted a relatively deferential 
principle of “narrow” proportionality under the Eighth Amendment.411   This weak 
standard of “gross disproportionality” examines sentences only to see if they are 
extreme, rather than carefully calibrated, and is reserved for the rare case.412  Under this 
standard, the Court has upheld most of the sentences it has reviewed.413  The Court’s 
experience with proportionality weighs in favor of such weak-form review under which 
the gross disproportionality standard captures extreme cases.   
Restoring the traditional standard of deference to remedial arbiters neutralizes 
the increasing activism of the Court.  Deferential review would mean the end of de novo 
appellate review of remedies and the return to a respect of judges and juries crafting 
remedies.  There is a sound basis for a rule of deference in determining the proper 
measure of relief because the factfinder is closer to the observed “truth” and facts. 
Judicial policymaking is minimized by tying the decision more closely to the facts or 
circumstances narrowly presented by each the case.   
Thus, this article ultimately suggests restoring remedial proportionality analysis 
to its traditional place as a tool of judicial review that is used sparingly to guide 
remedial decisions.  Returning to a moderate use of proportionality – call it narrow, or 
weak, or reasonable – employs proportionality only as an outer check upon potentially 
aberrant awards that go beyond the pale.  The deference solution, in other words, is an 
argument in favor of the way we were.     
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